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DECONSTRUCTING LOS ANGELES OR A SECRET FAX
FROM MAGRITTE REGARDING POSTLITERATE LEGAL
REASONING: A CRITIQUE OF LEGAL EDUCATION
C. Garrison Lepow*
Not only is it clear that most law students become impatient
at some point during their three years of formal education, but
it is clear also that how students learn the law is more the
cause of their impatience than what they learn.' Moreover,
others besides law students may be entitled to challenge the
style of education that manufactures a lawyer-culture. If one
assumes for the sake of argument that the intellectual
processes of lawyers, and consequently their values, differ from
those of their society, this fact does not explain the difference
between legal thinking and regular thinking, or explain why
there should not be harmony between the two.
The genre of a law review article is an ironic choice for an
argument against text-bound reasoning. This Article asks
readers to imagine the shapes and colors of legal issues; it
examines how people communicate and develop ideas through
moving, metamorphosing images, especially computer graphics,
and why methodology affects the eventual product of thought.
Like dance, legal issues are described better through action
than through words. Therefore, this Article challenges the
principles of verbal reasoning upon which our legal system is
based.
f Q 1993 C. Garrison Lepow, all rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law. J.D., Fordham University
School of Law; LL.M (taxation), New York University School of Law. I wish to thank
my colleague Joseph Lawson for his comments on an earlier draft and Robert E.
McKnight, Jr., Margaret Fuller, Bernadette Lee, and Benjamin Steiner for their
extraordinary research assistance.
1. In the process of legal education, typically intellectual and verbal law
professors often ignore "the emotional and connotative level of communication."
HERBERT L PACKER & THOMAS EHRLIC, NEW DMECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 30 (1972).
This approach causes their students to "suffer a severe loss in self-respect and possibly
even an identity crisis." Id. According to Packer and Ehrlich, the rationale for this
result is that the Socratic method is "meant to acclimate the students to 'legal
reasoning' or 'thinking like a lawyer.'" Id.
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The split between the thought processes of lawyers and
others in society2 has made lawyers less influential than in the
homogenous past and has made the legal remedies evolved from
the battle less functional. Many people perceive the work of
lawyers as a powerful, prohibitively destructive force. Lawyers
are "like nuclear warheads. They have theirs so you need
yours-but once you use them they fuck everything up. They're
only good in their silos."' One of popular culture's conventional
topics is that lawyers hold different values than the average
person.4 It seems that law students lose their innate (or at
2. See infra notes 25-36 and accompanying text. Anthropologist Lionel Tiger
specifies the difference in lawyers' hyperliteracy:
I am occasionally inclined to make the exaggerated observation that the only
sizable group in North American life which reads and writes a great deal and
carefully is lawyers, who demand up to $300 an hour for subjecting themselves
to this. In fact, one common complaint against lawyers is for their "legalese,"
their jargonic insistence on using language truly as a technology, with few if any
referents to known normal language. Hence it is baffling and soulless to those
who confront it.
LIONEL TIGER, THE MANUFACTURE OF EVIL 185 (1987).
3. JERRY STERNER, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 58 (1989). One lawyer described "[tlhe
true corporate lawyer" as "a neutron bomb kind of lawyer: the neutron bomb that kept
the buildings, the factories, and the bridges intact, and only killed the people in them."
ELLIOTr ABRAMS, UNDUE PROCESS 98 (1993). The lawyer thus described was Lawrence
Walsh, formerly of Davis, Polk & Wardwell, who became the special prosecutor in the
Iran-Contra investigation which convicted Abrams. Id. Even some legal scholars do
not view lawyers' work as an essential part of societal functioning but simply the
articulation of a hierarchy of power. Law "is called into being by the primary social
world in order to serve that world's need. Law is auxiliary-an excrescence on social
life, even if sometimes a useful excrescence." Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 60 (1984). "[Tlhe practice of law primarily consists of the
hermetic reproduction of that which already exists." Thomas C. Heller, Structuralism
and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127, 187 (1984); see also Mid-Year Meeting of Arnerican
Bar Association, 52 U.S.L.W. 2471 (Feb. 28, 1984) (quoting Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger's remarks at the Feb. 13-14 meeting, in which Burger criticized our legal
system as too costly, painful, destructive, and inefficient); David Margolick, Burger Says
Lawyers Make Legal Help Too Costly, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1984, at A13.
4. Lawyers look for evidence to prove a client's claim. The process of finding
evidence does not necessarily aim at finding "The Truth" in a conventional sense. The
popular view of the work lawyers do is negative. Often the defense of a guilty client
is seen as fraud or manipulation. See, e.g., Santa Barbara (NBC television broadcast,
Jan. 16, 1991) (depicting chaos as a jury acquits Dash of (date) rape; months later he
will realize he was guilty and apologize to the victim); JOHN MORTIMER, Rumpole and the
Blind Tasting, in RUMPOLE'S LAST CASE 9, 23 (1987) ("With Probert's knowledge of the
law and my irresistible way with a jury, we might, I felt, become a team which could
have got the Macbeths off regicide."). It is a jury's ancient and inalienable privilege to
acquit the guilty. Furthermore, the caution that lawyers advise often is viewed as
cowardice. See, e.g., Murphy Brown (CBS television broadcasts, Nov. 14, 1988 to
present) (depicting Brown constantly reminding the corporate lawyer not to let his tail
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least pre-law school) common sense and morality and do not
regain it after mastering legal technicalities.5 The perception
of differing values is a consequence of the accepted style of law
school education. The goal of this article is to discover how the
accepted style of law school education' shapes mental traits
distinctive in postmodern America and to discover whether it
is possible to impart intellectual competence without promoting
the kind of intellectual differences that have reduced lawyers
to the butt of a thousand jokes.'
get caught in the door as he leaves). But see TASK FORCE ON LAW SCH. AND THE PROFES-
SION, ABA, STATEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL LAWYERING SKILLS AND PROFESSIONAL VALUES 90
(1992) [hereinafter LAWYERING SKILLS I (stating that "'serving the public in a competent
manner' must be a primary objective of every [lawyer]").
5. As one law professor notes,
[Tihe traditional classroom fosters adversariness, argumentativeness, and
zealotry, along with the view that lawyers are only the means through which
clients accomplish their ends.
Students, because they are laughed at, abandon the common sense and
morality they bring to law school and may not relearn them after mastering the
technicalities of law.
Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics?, 41 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 3, 7,8 (1991); see also Owen M. Fiss, The Challenge Ahead, 1 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. viii (1988). Fiss attacks the proponents of the theory of analysis called Law
and Economics, who value mathematics and "place a premium upon purely behavioral
or empirical studies, which generally presuppose the existence of some measurable goal
and a form of activity that is fully observable and which, like rocks rolling down a hill,
remains undisturbed by observation." Id. at xi. Fiss calls the interdisciplinary studies,
such as law and the humanities, "an attempt to free contemporary law from its own
barrenness." Id.
6. One commentator describes law-school education thus: a "moral relativism
tending toward nihilism, a pragmatism tending toward an amoral instrumentalism, a
realism tending toward cynicism, an individualism tending toward atomism, and a faith
in reason and democratic processes tending toward mere credulity and idolatry."
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 3 (quoting Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion
of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247, 262 (1978)). However, Menkel-
Meadow argues that "rather than reinforcing the status quo [by teaching law case by
case], law teachers should be asking, how are law making and lawyering related,
interwoven, recursive, and constitutive of each other?" Id. at 7 n.22. Menkel-Meadow
observes that her attempts to instill other values in students provokes an unaccepting
response: "Teaching evaluations, for instance, suggest that someone should tell me that
the 1960s are over." Id. at 5 n.8.
7. Typically, critics indicate dissatisfaction with the time lawyers spend (and bill).
"Lawyers are like cab drivers stuck in traffic. They don't do anything-but their meter
is always ticking." STERNER, supra note 3, at 21. For an insider's similar evaluation, see
J.M. Balkin, Deconstrctive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987).
According to Balkin, lawyers "spend most of their time trying to understand what other
lawyers have said in legal texts." Id. at 744. Law teachers theorize, and (in theory)
practitioners use these theories to advise or argue cases for their clients. Id.; see also
Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Any-
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Lawyers have been criticized for ages. In the early Renais-
sance, Petrarch's followers complained that "the lawyers were
unhistorical and that they had no interest in the arts."8 In
contemporary America, the proper complaint is that law
schools' exclusive use of texts to teach law does not adequately
prepare students to solve tax, economics, or international trade
problems that develop from personal relationships.9 Further,
even if one accepts a narrow role for the lawyer, not as
negotiator and advisor but solely as litigator,0 lawyers who
present verbal arguments are less persuasive than those who
add visual presentations;11 this fact is not taught in law school.
way?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 13 (1991) ("Theory begets no practice, only more text.
It proceeds as if you can deconstruct power relations by shifting their markers around
in your head.").
8. MYRON P. GILMORE, HUMANISTS AND JURISTS 30 (1963).
9. One scholar claims that "[It had long since been clear to the rising generation
of young academics that the Langdellian claims that all law could be found in the books
and that law was a series of logically interwoven objective principles were, at most,
useful myths." ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850S TO THE 1980S, at 134 (1983). Except for enclaves of clinical educators, the pioneer-
ing work of interactive video lessons, and pirate copies of Palsgraf, the Movie, legal
education begins and ends with a text, the statutes and appellate cases. "Law schools
pay virtually no attention to client service or ghettoize instruction having to do with
clients and client counselling in clinical courses." Austin Sarat, Lawyers and Clients:
Putting Professional Service on the Agenda of Legal Education, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 43,
43 (1991).
The tales of Rumpole, the fictional English criminal lawyer, dramatize the break
between the academy and practicing lawyers. Rumpole dislikes cases that turn on "a
nice point of law"; he says, "Getting on for half a century knocking around the Courts
has given me a profound distaste for the law. Give me a bloodstain or two, a bit of
disputed typewriting or a couple of hairs on a cardigan, and I am happy as the day is
long." MORTIMER, supra note 4, at 22. Langdell's view that all law could be found in
the books belied the common practice in a time when most lawyers clerked rather than
attending law school. See THOMAS L. CHADBOURNE, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS L.
CHADBOURNE 28-29 (Charles C. Goetsch & Margaret L. Shivers eds., 1985) (describing
the nature of the relationship that introduced young lawyers to the practice and how
that relationship carried over to the close relations between the corporate lawyer and
his clients during the 1920s).
10. Butsee MODELRuLEs OFPROFESSIONAL CONDUCTRule 2.1 (1984) ("In rendering
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral,
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation.").
11. See Phil Patton, Up from Flatland, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,1992, § 6 (Magazine),
at 28, 31 ("In a courtroom chart prepared by Bruce Cutler and Susan Kellman, lawyers
for John Gotti, X marked the spot where Government witnesses and their own criminal
past intersected"; Gotti was acquitted in that trial.) Here, it is assumed that the visual
representation gets attention and clarifies an important point to the trier of fact. In
a case concerning a breach of express and implied warranties in the manufacture of
metal components for a mooring system, a chart converted the complexity of the steel
manufacturing process to a simple flow chart showing two pathways for the
manufacture of steel: the defective method and the proper method. Lucker Mfg. v.
Milwaukee Steel Foundry, No. CIV.A.91-2258, 1991 WL 225006, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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One of the fundamentals of legal education is to teach
students a special way to think.'2 Legal education developed
from the study of classical science,' 3 which concerns "static
phenomena rather than the vital forces and flows that produce
the shapes we see from instant to instant."14 Thus, lawyers, in
the classical scientific tradition," describe the world as if it
15524 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 1991) (utilizing a two-color chart created by Courtroom
Graphics). See generally GREGORY P. JOSEPH, MODERN VISUAL EVIDENCE § 1.01 (1992)
(including photographs of computer-generated simulations in an appendix); 3 CHARLES
C. SCOTT, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE §§ 1291-1340 (1969 & Supp. 1991) (explaining the use
of videotapes as evidence); id. § 1326 (discussing the admissibility of surveillance video-
tapes of crimes being perpetrated); Jane B. Baird, New from the Computer: 'Cartoons'
for the Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1992, at F5; Rorie Sherman, Moving Graphics:
Computer Animation Enters Criminal Cases, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 6, 1992, at 1 (reporting
that computer animation adds TV showmanship to evidence in criminal cases).
12. Legal reasoning, however, does not require three years of training. "Since the
necessary analytical techniques have been learned by the first year, or shortly thereaf-
ter, and since the Socratic method is an immensely wasteful way to impart information,
some teachers are not sure that they teach anything at all in the last two years."
PACKER & EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 32.
13. According to Robert Stevens, "Langdell never wavered in his view that law was
a science and that the center of legal education was the library .... " STEVENS, supra
note 9, at 53.
14. JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 197 (1987). Gleick used the word
static in the quotation in the ordinary, nontechnical sense to describe the method by
which traditional physics describes motion. On the other hand, in Newtonian physics
statics is the study of objects at rest, while dynamics is the study of moving objects.
In the traditional science, the study of motion breaks flow into a series of steps; motion
itself is not understood -as a flow. There is a beginning point and an end point, but
what happens in between is unknown. According to the theory of dynamics, this
unknown is irrelevant. Thus, the Newtonian study of dynamics in effect is static, in
that the analysis requires that the continuous flow of motion be stopped at a series of
connecting points. The course of the movement is transmuted into set intervals where
a moment in time is defined only by an equation unrelated to its path or course. The
continuous flow must be stopped at a series of connecting points. According to
Laplacian theory, one can write the equations of dynamics as if they were equations of
static equilibrium provided that one accounts for all of the inertial forces. Id., at 14.
Thus, motion is not the fluid force of water down a drain, nor O.J. Simpson at the
airport, but the jerky movements of the minute hand on an antique school clock or a
baby's first steps. The action is stopped so that it can be analyzed, enlarged, observed
and ordered step by step starting with point "I" and traveling through segments from
subpart "(a) in general," to, for example, "subpart 1.401(k)-I(a)(5)(iv)" (provisions of the
Treasury Regulations regarding nonqualified cash provisions in qualified pension
plans). Flow, the constant movement, the unknown, becomes an orderly progression.
Thus, a phenomenon that is complex and changing becomes linear and certain. With
education, one disregards the object in motion. One learns instead to see the motion
frozen, the snapshot or still that it has become. Hence, although the object is not at
rest in the Newtonian sense, it is static in a less technical sense.
15. Traditional science analyzes systems in terms of their constituent parts, that
is, continuously seeking to break down objects to the elusive smallest particle-the
atom to the neutron to the neutrino. It eschews the study of the universe we see and
touch, that is, life on a human scale.
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were at rest.16  Arnheim argues that "[t]his selective
apprehension overshadows our awareness that percepts are
prominently dynamic.
" 17
Lawyers learn to ignore what the world sees-ongoing,
changing relationships, the flow'--and to focus on a system of
ordered objects, as if business relationships and families were
physical objects which could be described by the traits 9 that
law deems relevant and that lawyers learn to manipulate like
game pieces.20 In fact, it is called playing by the rules.2'
In the spring of 1992, not only the rules but the legal system
itself came under literal attack. A jury found that the eighty-
one-second videotape showing the Los Angeles police deliver
16. See RUDOLF ARNHEIM, Perceptual Dynamics in Musical Expression, in NEW
ESSAYS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ART 214 (1986) (explaining the classical view that objects
are either at rest or in motion).
17. I.
18. Flow connotes "shape plus change, motion plus form." GLEICK, supra note 14,
at 195. Flow is used in a Platonic sense to reflect a reality transcending a given mo-
ment. Id. Flows 'produce the shapes we see from instant to instant." Id. at 197. Flow
also is connected to the universal forms found in thousands of things such as a leaf, a
flame, a liquid within a liquid, or a solid growing crystal. Id. at 196.
19. For ease of handling, one thinks of the world as consisting of "things,' which
are defined by their physical properties, i.e., their shape, size, color, texture, etc."
ARNHEIM, supra note 16, at 214. But cf GEORGE RODRIGUE, Leaving My Bad SelfBehind
(painting 1991) (using color to describe the psychic attributes of a deceased pet; the red
dog is the evil side of the ghost dog), in BLUE DOG series (1988-92); Clancy DuBos, Hot
Dog! Cajun Artist's Whimsical Blue Dog Among Louisiana's Hottest Exports, GAMBIT,
Aug. 6, 1991, at 15-16 (discussing the philosophical content of the Blue Dog series).
Law students visit a world where objects possess specific traits, e.g., corporate traits
versus partnership traits. See, e.g., Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976)
(distinguishing an association from a limited partnership for tax purposes); BORIS I.
BITIER & JAMES S. Eusc, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF OJRPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
92.01[4] (5th ed. 1987) (describing how to "[uinscramble] the eggs on a change of
classification"). The complex problem of applying statutory or historical traits to real-
life business activity is illustrated in the area of corporate taxation. See id. 16
(discussing corporate tax attributes).
20. The object is to win the game. Regular people do not understand the purpose
of the game. See Patricia J. Williams, The Rules of the Game, VOICE, May 12, 1992, at
32. One commentator suggests "that a poststructuralist account of the law treat any
existing set of legal practices as a succession of theoretically arbitrary signs.... The
core of the training and work of lawyers is to learn these practices [ways of being] and
how to manipulate them." Heller, supra note 3, at 187.
21. There are "rules and metarules." John M. Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Some
Lessons About the Law from Self-Referential Problems in Mathematics, 90 MICH. L. REV.
992, 1008 (1992). '[Llaw is often in ultimate practical terms what the lawyer thinks
the legal system will allow or require. Just like geometric theorems that only
occasionally may be verified by mapping onto spatial reality, legal truth may only
occasionally be pinned down by a court decision." Id at 999.
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fifty-six baton blows to Rodney King' was not sufficient evi-
dence to convict the four officers who carried on the assault.'
In the course of the trial, the defense attorneys played the tape
"over and over, freezing the frames"' so that the rhythm and
. 22. The amateur videotape made by George Haliday, whose apartment terrace
overlooked the highway, A Current Affair (NBC television broadcast, Apr. 20, 1993),
and was shown on television stations around the world, A Jarring Verdict, An Angry
Spasm, TIME, May 11, 1992, at 10, 10.
23. The charges against the officers included assault with a deadly weapon, using
excessive force as a police officer, filing a false report, and becoming an accessory after
the fact. Three of the four officers were acquitted. The jury was unable to agree on the
conviction or acquittal of the remaining officer. See generally Seth Mydans, Los Angeles
Policemen Acquitted in Taped Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al, D22. Many
believe that the change of venue from Los Angeles, an economically and ethnically
mixed urban area, to Simi Valley, a virtually all white (only two percent of the
population is black), middle-class suburban area, determined the verdict. See, e.g.,
Assessing the Verdict and Its Legal Fallout, NAVL L.J., May 11, 1992, at 15 (printing an
interview with Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr., named as the L.A. Trial Lawyers Association
1990 Attorney of the Year for his success in litigating police abuse cases).
The verdict was followed by days of rioting in Los Angeles in which much of South
Central Los Angeles burned. The police lost control of the city and the National Guard
was called to restore order. The violence was covered live on television. A gang
assaulted a truck driver as TV cameras from a helicopter recorded an attacker
smashing the driver's skull with a brick. Neighborhood residents rescued the truck
driver. There were no police anywhere near the scene. See generally Tom Mathews,
The Siege of L.A., NEWSWEEK, May 11, 1992, at 30; Nightly News (NBC television
broadcast, May 29, 1992).
A year later, a federal jury in Los Angeles convicted the officer responsible for most
of the blows and the police sergeant in charge of the arrest of violating Rodney King's
civil rights. The other two officers again were acquitted. Seth Mydans, 2 of 4 Officers
Found Guilty in Los Angeles Beatings, Tension Eases as Residents Hail the Verdict, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, at Al. In the second trial, the government's evidence included
the testimony of Rodney King and other eyewitnesses. Seth Mydans, Points of
Evidence, Not Emotion, Prosecution Wins 2 Convictions with More Than Videotape, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, at A19. The defense was almost identical to the first trial.
Defense in Beating Trial Breaks Little New Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1993, at A8.
24. One writer described "[t~he frames of the videotape [being] played individually,
like... transcendently isolated moments rather than as part of a motion called history,
having a tempo or chronology that meant anything." Williams, supra note 20, at 32.
Newspaper columnist Anna Quindlen is among the commentators who have attributed
the verdict to racism:
The lawyers told the jurors that they had to pay attention to what happened
before the videotape started rolling. Here's what came before: Ronald Reagan,
Willie Horton, rotten schools, no jobs, falling plaster, broken boilers, David Duke.
Years and years of rage and racism, measured now in angry words and broken
glass.
Anna Quindlen, Across the Divide, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1992, at A17; see also Anthony
Lewis, A Lost Country, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1992, at A17.
Jurors found the still images ambiguous and the defense attorneys argued that
"there were alternative explanations for King's wounds and broken bones." Lou
Cannon & Leef Smith, Jurors: Tape Not Whole Story, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), May 1, 1992, at Al; see also Lee A. Daniels, Some Identified as Jurors Aren't
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meaning were lost in the ambiguity of unrelated still images
which the defense lawyers argued could have looked like an
attempt by King to attack or flee.
Page by page, the defense lawyers created a narrative distinct
from the pictoral memory of the eyewitnesses and shifted the
power to interpret the meaning of the event from the witness
to the viewer. The frozen bits of video are analogous to a
postmodern painting by David Salle in that the style of the
evidence became deliberately ambiguous in its unrelated bits
and images. In Salle's work, the meaning of the picture is in
the viewer's response rather than the artist's intent.25 Like the
examination of potential moves on a checker board, the viewer's
eye need not move from left to right, nor from top to bottom.26
No single interpretation is correct. The information appears
stripped of illusion. Hence, interpreting the event appears as
a puzzle to be solved with logic, and without emotion. The
fragments of frozen action become individual images that can
be shuffled 27 and read like a Tarot deckY
Changing the King video to a series of stills was a typically
lawyer-like thing to do. In addition, the analysis was literary
in the way that postmodern art has become literary.' In the
confines of the legal system, within the courthouse in Simi
Valley, the change of form altered the perception of the event
significantly. It was as if Mozart's The Magic Flute were
in Accord on TV, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at A23 (reporting that the jurors felt that
King was in control of the action).
25. See WILLIAM V. DUNNING, CHANGING IMAGES OF PICTORIAL SPACE: A HISTORY OF
SPATIAL ILLUSION IN PAINTING 229-31 (1991).
26. DAVID SALLE, DUAL ASPECT PICIURE (painting 1986) (allowing separate images to
be read in any direction: left-right, up-down, diagonally). Similarly, in his poem snap
shots, Jack Collom creates word groups which can be read down or across and stanzas
that invite random order. See JACK COLLOM, snap shots, in 8-BALL 18 (1992).
27. See PHILIP GARRISON, AUGURY 133 (1991) (comparing the narrative to a deck of
cards).
28. This is what some commentators describe as the indeterminate language of
legal discourse. See, e.g., Rogers & Molzon, supra note 21, at 1007-08 (citing Mark V.
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793 (1983)); cf. Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and
the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance and Enforcement Under Article Nine,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 363 (1988) (stating that "[a~ll understanding begins in lan-
guage").
29. The stills are literary in the sense that they create boundaries within which
one analyzes the language of the visual art. According to Derrida, postmodern art is
aligned with the visual expression that developed into the alphabet and the meta-art
of painting, which is inspired by other painting. This literary-visual format cannot
speak for itself but requires the audience to view other sources to create meaning.
DUNNING, supra note 25, at 119 (citing JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 293 (Gayatri
C. Spivak trans., 1976)).
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played note by note with analysis between each note. Outside
the context of the rest of the piece, each note becomes mean-
ingless noise. The rhythm and context of the musical event and
not merely its content of notes obviously are critical to the
comprehension of the piece by the audience. By fragmenting
action into a series of still photographs, lawyers changed a real
event in life to a legal event in a courtroom. The difference in
perception between the world at large and the jury in the
Rodney King case illustrates the difference between legal
thinking and regular thinking.
The public rejection of the trial outcome differs only in degree
from the public disapproval of other legal results. It seems that
the legal system "has strayed far from human intuition about
the world." 0 The reason for this break between the public and
the legal system is rooted in the way we learn the law.31
The principal mental habit which identifies lawyers is a
peculiar analytical technique based on asking rude questions.3 2
We call this "thinking like a lawyer."' Lawyerly thinking
begins with questions, as perhaps other modes of thought do,
but the questions function differently for lawyers. In general,
regular people use questions to elicit information. In contrast,
the lawyer uses questions to isolate issues which can be solved
by legal principles. 4 Lawyer-questioners pursue an admission.
30. GLEICK, supra note 14, at 6 (paraphrasing an original reference to theoretical
physics).
31. Anthropologist Lionel Tiger argues that school-induced notions of justice are
not consistent with human nature:
Justice must not only be seen to be done, but people will try to see it being done,
even when they are not involved. It is satisfying in some way we might be
tempted to call primordial. With more information and a wiser eye, we can see
it as in continuity with the past. Yet in how many law schools are courses given
about the relationship between equity and emotion? Are lawyers trained to
understand the phylogeny of probity? Are they provided any appropriate
information about the possible role of justice in early formative hominid societies?
TIGER, supra note 2, at 47.
32. Ree Adler, who was named outstanding young lawyer by the New York State
Bar Association in 1992, explained her propensity for lawyering: "When I was little,
my parents called me a pest, and that's a wonderful trait for a lawyer." David
Margolick, At the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1992, at B10. Adler was sixty-three when
she won the award and was working at the time for the New York Neighborhood Legal
Services in Buffalo; she graduated from law school in 1983. Id-
33. See PACKER & EHRLUCH, supra note 1, at 30.
34. Law students learn to separate complex problems into a series of simple
questions or units and then to solve each unit by applying relevant principles of law.
What is relevant depends upon the question. As a lawyer giving advice, trying a case,
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Lawyers channel inquiry to support a remedy.' Lawyers see
the world as what can be written down in documents.1 In
contrast, regular people see more. They are more open to
interpreting events and engaging in transactions that do not fit
into the system that the law ordains. Technology, especially
television and computers, has changed the culture from a
literate culture to one which is particularly skeptical of words.
This change separated text-bound legal thinking from the
common perceptions of the world.
Let me first explain how I use the term "literate." "Liter-
ate" describes an alphabet-based culture in which print
dominates. Reasoning in a literate culture relies on the use
of abstract systems of classification based on ideal forms.37
In contrast to literate reasoning, "preliterate" reasoning,
or arguing on appeal, one learns to limit facts. The success of any of these efforts may
be clear on paper. But the law does not directly consider whether a victory will
alleviate the client's problem. Law, in the social science tradition, does not merely
identify issues to solve, but "create[s] issues that must be solved." Cf. Roger
Rosenblatt, How to End the Abortion War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1992, § 6 (Magazine),
at 26, 42 (arguing that "American society ... has shifted intellectually from a
humanistic to a social science culture; that is, from a culture used to dealing with
contrarieties to one that demands definite, provable answers"). See generally Charles
W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining the As-
sumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 DUKE L.J. 191, 193-94 (1991)
(distinguishing humanistic intellectual authority of original texts and the institutional
(primarily nonintellectual) authority of court opinions).
35. Lawyers do not ask questions at trial to discover information: "Certainly no
lawyer should ask a critical question unless he is reasonably sure of the answer."
FRANCIS L. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 23 (1948).
36. The words of a client's complaint (story) are searched for some legal
significance. The process of creating legal documents is one of discarding pieces of our
clients' problems. We learn to find the issues for which courts provide a remedy. We
learn to cite authority for everything we say and hence show that nothing is really new
or unique. Unique might mean there is as yet no remedy from the court. See generally
Collier, supra note 34, at 200 (stating that Langdell's declaration that one finds law in
books caused the limiting rather than expanding of inquiry); id. at 193 n.8 (discussing
lawyers' tendency to push the theoretical limits of the law). But see LAWYERING SKILLS,
supra note 4, at 23-24 (recognizing creativity as an element of problem solving).
37. In the West, the self is an ideal form and individuals are variations of the ideal
self. The concept of the individual 'embraces the Enlightenment's assumption of a
universal, stable, and to a large extent, pre-social, individual identity." Adeno Addis,
Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 615, 633 (1991). "[The] individual inscribes every other individual." Id. at 675.
Literate culture tends "to complete and hence freeze political and social stories" (Addis
calls this cultural tendency modernist rather than literate). Id. 'The abstract
individual and the abstract community are invoked to write a unitary and final
story .... " Id. (emphasis added).
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which is characteristic of oral cultures,' emphasizes concrete
relationships.3 ' Finally, the term "postliterate"40 denotes the
shift in postmodern America4' away from communication via
words and texts, the hallmarks of literate culture, 42 to
38. Accounts of oral cultures indicate that the learning in these groups is
experiential or kinetic and not simply based on words. Kinetic learning is distinctive
from literate and visual learning in that it does not include a snapshot or stagnant
representation. Kinetic, experiential, patterned movement represents the change of
things over time, the rituals of extended families which develop a separate cultural
identity in their young. See, e.g., TONY HILLERMAN, TALKING GOD 34-36 (1989) (describing
a Native American healing dance); LES DANSES RONDES, (Marie del Norte Theriot &
Catherine B. Blanchet eds., 1955) (collection of folk dances reflecting part of the
socialization process in Cajun Louisiana); see also BARRY J. ANCELET, CAJUN MUSIC: ITS
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS 16 (1989) ("Everyone dances, even grandm re and
grandp~re .... There may be only a couple of fiddles to play for the crowd, there may
be only four candles for light,... and only exceptionally a few bottles of tafia diluted
with water for refreshment; no matter, everyone dances." (quoting C.C. Robin's travel
account)).
39. An individuars identity is as a part of a group. One is someone's cousin,
another's parent. Roles shift for the individual, however, and the group relies on and
functions through the totality of the players. Perception is personal and individual
because of one's geographic and psychic location, physical condition, and life experience.
"The perception of any object, either tangible or abstract, is ultimately made a thousand
times more complicated whenever it is viewed within the circle of an entire People as
a whole." HYEMEYOHSTS STORM, SEVEN ARROWS 4 (1972). People are destined"to Touch,
Experience and Learn." Id at 7; see also infra text accompanying notes 110-12.
40. I use the term "postliterate" to describe an individual who is well educated but
not in a pre-1970s liberal arts way. A pre-1970s education included classical literature,
philosophy, foreign languages, and at least one course in music and art appreciation.
41. The postmodern era is characterized by a rejection of a single correct view or
even of an objective fact. The era's hallmark is diversity; its science is chaos. See
generally GIANNI VATTIMo, THE END OF MODERNITY (Jon R. Snyder trans., 1991). The
postmodern man or woman believes not in progress but in cycles, and is obsessed with
hermeneutics. A postmodern comment on this definition is: "Ihat's one way of saying
it."
42. A culture entails an "apparatus," which includes as its elements technology,
ideology, and institutional practices. Alphabetic culture's technology is print, its ideolo-
gy is originality and analysis, and its institutional practices demand the essay or
treatise style of writing. See GREGORY L. ULMER, TELETHEORY 4-5 (1991). In contrast,
contemporary technology is a new kind of oral culture that Ulmer calls "orality."
Orality entails different technologies. It need not, however, entail different ideologies.
Ulmer explains as follows:
Enforcement of the standards of the treatise and even of the'essay in academic
discourse as the best and highest expression of reason may no longer be taken
seriously as "objective" fact, according to the argument of the apparatus, but as
the projection of these forms onto writing itself, extending the conventions
developed for the specialized needs of schooling to function as the norms of
thought itself.
Id at 5. The purpose of postliterate education is to develop patterns of inventive
thinking that will compensate for our society's heavy emphasis on alphabetics-based
analysis and will help bring about a cognitively balanced culture.
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communication via plastic visual media.43
This shift, however, is not simply a return to preliterate
reasoning. Computers, for example, project concrete objects,
but the style of reasoning encouraged by computer learning
is not equivalent to that of a preliterate culture. Seeing an
image of a flower on the screen, or seeing the blueprint for a
rose's DNA, is an experience largely devoid of sensory
input.44  The image is abstract.45  Postliterate thinking
combines concrete and abstract forms of reasoning in a way
that creates its own interpretation of common events. For
example, computer graphics programs allow things to move
around easily, in ways that the literal mind would sense as
turned upside down. These manufactured images suggest the
flow of systems with two nonlinear characteristics. First,
everything moves in chaotic patterns. Second, and as a
consequence of the first, the context of any given thing is
always changing. Yet changes always are revocable.
Hence, the terms "computer literate" and "literate" do not
merely describe two skills, such as the abilities to spell and to
add, required of educated individuals, but rather they describe
a change in the process of reasoning. Postliterate thinking is
expressed primarily through nonverbal means. The essence of
postliterate reasoning is watching football on TV without the
sound while listening to classical music. Because the physical
separation of the football field from the concert hall does not
affect the viewer/listener, the two events occur simultaneously
in the same room. To the viewer, the separation of the football
field and the concert hall does not exist in space at the point of
43. See BLUE MAN GROUP, TUBES (1991) (satirizing art and science, including
Magritte's painting and fractal clusters, through a virtually nonverbal stage
production); GLEICK, supra note 14, at 114-15, 197 (describing fractal pictures that could
be generated by simple computer programs). The patterns produced in fractal pictures,
made possible by computers, redirected the nature of scientific inquiry and the
communication of scientific ideas. Id. at 6.
44. Sound, touch, smell, and taste are not affected. In contrast, when one "sees"
in real life, senses other than sight are involved. See RUDOLF ARNHEIM, FILM AS ART
31-32 (1958). Most significantly, the pull of gravity no longer orients one's vision. For
example, when one witnesses an event, no matter where one looks, one knows whether
one is walking, running, standing still, or prone. Id. at 24-25.
45. The picture of the rose is abstract in the sense that the rose purposely is
viewed cut off from the bush, removed from the ground, separated from its life force.
There is no emotional relationship between the viewer and the flower. The image is not
unique. It can be replicated infinitely or it can be changed easily and completely. In
contrast, one cannot imagine Saint-Exupdry at a word processor. See ANTOINE DE SAINT-
EXUPARY, LE PETIT PRINCE (Katherine Woods trans., 1943) (telling the story of a stormy,
G-rated romance between a boy and his unique flower, with drawings by the author).
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the experience. Hence, the physical underpinning for the
convention of experiencing each event as a separate phenom-
enon is displaced electronically. The music and the movement
of the players, conventionally classified as art and sport, fuse
to become as unified a composition as ballet.
46
This same notion of fusing separate phenomena is expressed in
the photo-realist painting of a street scene in which both the
reflection of the street in the plate glass, and the store behind
the glass, are shown at once. The painting is "realistic" except
that the focus is not humanly possible.47 The index system
characteristic of print media does not acknowledge the notions
inspired by technology, such as the ability of a computer image
to focus simultaneously on both the front and back of an object4"
and the ability of the camera lens to see more than its human
model.49  Postliterate thinking develops from Magritte's
painting of a pipe with the caption, "This is not a pipe. " "
46. The universal, assimilated norm seems as quaint and archaic as a cup of
regular coffee in a Seattle coffee shop. The center of art does not exist; neither the
Paris of the 1920s nor the New York of the 1950s. Centers exist simultaneously every-
where from Tokyo to Mamou and interrelate and change because "groups are
contingent.... [Tiheir very meaning can be rearranged and recast .... " Addis, supra
note 37, at 650. In the postliterate society, variations of perspective are as easy to
accommodate as the computer-generated children's story. Each slightly different
printout is both an original and a copy. Furthermore, these variations are not inferior
to the universal ideal form. No priestly caste holds the power to create or to preserve
learning or art.
47. DUNNING, supra note 25, at 208 ("The eye must focus on one image at the
expense of the other."). For example, the subway rider at the window alternatively can
focus on her reflection in the glass and be unable to see through the glass, or she can
focus on the tunnel walls and be unable to see her reflection. The camera, unlike the
subway rider, can focus on both scenes at once. See DON EDDY, NEW SHOES FOR H
(painting 1973-74); EUGENE ATGET, MAGASIN AVENUE DES GOBELINS (photograph 1925).
48. Chaos scientists developed ways to use graphic images to "capture a fantastic
and delicate structure underlying complexity" and described the new elements of
motion such as fractals, bifurcations, intermittencies, periodicities, folded-towel
diffeomorphisms, and smooth-noodle maps. GLEICK, supra note 14, at 4-5. This way
of seeing things was painted by Magritte earlier in the century. See RENE MAGRITTE,
DANGEROUS RELATIONSHIPS (painting 1936) (showing simultaneously the front and back
views of a woman partly hidden by a mirror).
49. Computer research for lawyers uses literate methods of libraries and indices
which perpetuate the limitations of print-based reasoning. Thus, even the high-tech
lawyer's paradigm is limited by text to verbal expression of events and relations.
50. RENE MAGRITTE, LATRAHISON DES IMAGES(painting 1928-29);cf. Balkin,supra
note 7, at 749 (1987) (comparing words to signs). Magritte questioned the conventions
of reality which he felt were based on ignoring the paradoxes one encounters in
everyday life. His work caught "the confusions and oversimplifications which are so
deeply rooted in our habits of language that they are not even noticed." SUZi GABLIK,
MAGRITIE 126 (1970). As Wittgenstein taught, language as a constructed model "does
not necessarily tally with reality." Id- Magritte's painting "show[s] that representation
is a complex process which involves more than mere mirroring or the imitation of
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Postliterate thinkers question both physical and metaphysical
reality, yet they reason without words."'
American culture is dominated by visual, semantic images.
The national collective memory includes watching Jack Ruby
step towards Lee Harvey Oswald, Ronald Reagan wave before
the shot, the Challenger explode, Los Angeles catch fire. Live
television broadcasts made the viewers participants in these
events. In less dramatic moments, when television organizes
information in visual charts, graphs, and maps, the most
familiar of these, the weather map, moves. The postliterate
generation thinks in terms of movement representing changes
across space and time.
Static legal thinking starkly contrasts with postliterate
thinking. Law students are like the last kid to learn about
Santa Claus; they still solve problems by reasoning through
idealized forms.52  They learn to separate the rights and
objects." Id. at 137.
Other visual artists have depicted the ambiguity of language visually. See, e.g.,
BRUCE NAUMAN, VIOLINS/VIOLENCE (drawing 1985) (depicting three violins captioned
"violence"); Gail D. Cox, Rioting Derails the Legal System in L.A., NAT'L L.J., May 1,
1992, at 6 (relating that amid the shattered glass of a courthouse, one remaining panel
was spray painted "No Justice, No Peace"); see also Roger Green, Diddley Bows Expand
Vibrantly, GAMBIT, Feb. 4, 1992, at 26 (reviewing John T. Scott's 1992 kinetic sculpture
Poydras Street Dancing: Uptown Second Line, which combines African myth, the shape
of the one-stringed Louisiana/Mississippi instrument called a diddley bow, the spirit of
jazz music, and Mardi Gras dancing, and stating that the sculpture evokes spatial and
psychic ambiguity in a downtown New Orleans office building).
51. See generally RUDOLF ARNHEIM, A Plea for Visual Thinking, in NEW ESSAYS ON
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ART, supra note 16, at 135-52. According to Arnheim, "Productive
thinking operates by means of the things to which language refers-referents that in
themselves are not verbal, but perceptual." Id. at 138. For example, a young child
shown two identical beakers of water will think that when the liquid in one vessel is
poured into a third, taller and narrower vessel, the third vessel has more water. An
older child will realize that the volume of water is the same. Id. at 137 (discussing an
experiment designed by psychologist Jean Piaget). The thought process of the older
child does not need words. Words, however, can help codify the results. Id. at 139.
52. John Dewey wrote,
Any philosophy that in its quest for certainty ignores the reality of the
uncertain in the ongoing processes of nature denies the conditions out of which
it arises. The attempt to include all that is doubtful within the fixed grasp of that
which is theoretically certain is committed to insincerity and evasion, and in
consequence will have the stigmata of internal contradiction. Every such
philosophy is marked at some point by a division of its subject-matter into the
truly real and the merely apparent, a subject and an object, a physical and a
mental, an ideal and an actual, that have nothing to do with one another, save
in some mode which is so mysterious as to create an insoluble problem.
Action is the means by which a problematic situation is resolved.
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liabilities of the parties in a relationship and to classify the
transaction in abstract, nonrelational ways. Students learn
to focus on a time and a place, to form opinions based on
facts presumed to be (and thus continuing to be) true' rather
than based upon ongoing conditions. They learn to manage
long-term relationships, for example a partnership, with a
written agreement. Generally, the agreement will be
enforced according to the conditions prevalent at the time of
its formation,' as if the day could be pulled out of time and
analyzed like a biopsy. Law students acquire a skill that
works if the world stops; 55 time merely separates relevant
from irrelevant events. A contractual relationship is not
modified by ongoing conditions. Time in a contract or in a
legal opinion is not dynamic.5"
JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTANuY: A SiuDY OF THE RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND
ACTION 244 (Capricorn Books 1960) (1929).
53. Keats seems to share the assumption, essential to law, that still figures or
printed words can express meaningful, dynamic relations. Keats wrote:
Bold Lover, never, never canst thou kiss,
Though winning near the goal-yet, do not grieve;
She cannot fade, though thou hast not thy bliss,
For ever wilt thou love, and she be fair!
JOHN KEATS, Ode to a Grecian Urn (commenting on how the figures on the urn are
frozen in time forever), reprinted in SELECTED POEMS AND LETTERS 207, 208 (Riverside
ed., Houghton Mifflin 1959) (1820)
54. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977) (providing that unconscionable contracts are not
enforceable). The Uniform Commercial Code does not include bargains turned bad in
the scope of "unconscionable," only those which were bad when made.
55. See LAWYERING SKILLS, supra note 4, at 30 ("[A]lthough hypotheticals do provide
factual diversity, each hypothetical asks the students to accept a given set of facts as
a closed universe of facts.").
56. See Big Horn Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1259 (10th Cir.
1988) (holding that the defendant, who allegedly reduced coal purchases to satisfy
environmental regulations, breached a contract where defendant never had any
environmental problems, only operational problems, and invoked the force majeure
clause as a pretext to avoid a large oversupply of coal); Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 440 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (finding that the fact that a contract no
longer is profitable for an oil supplier, because the price had risen from $5 per barrel
to $11 per barrel, is not commercial impracticability sufficient to modify the contract);
Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, 335 N.E.2d 320, 323 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that the seller
had a good faith contractual obligation to produce a product for the buyer, even if the
venture no longer was profitable for the seller, unless the product was a significant part
of the seller's enterprise).
57. In contrast to American contract law, the Japanese Civil Code excuses
performance when it has become impossible. Dan Rosen, The Koan of Law in Japan,
18 N. KY. L. REV. 367, 393 (1991). For example, if prices change drastically because of
triple-digit inflation, the Japanese courts have altered contractual obligations-
reasoning that such outcomes are too unlikely to be foreseen by anyone. Id.
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However, the world outside the courtroom moves. s8 Text-
bound reasoning is frustrating to the partners, who remain
in a relationship for longer than the day on which the
agreement was effected.5 9 If the conditions that formed the
basis of the contract negotiations once were true, but no
longer are true, then the result that once was fair, or at least
bargained for, no longer is fair. 6° For example, when a party
to a suddenly burdensome long-term contract faces living
with past assumptions or ending the contract, the law can
58. Continuing mercantile relationships cause frustrations similar to the
frustration stemming from the world's continuity of motion. See Henry Gabriel, The
Seller's Election of Remedies Under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Expectation
Theory, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429,446-47 (1988). Gabriel notes that the drafters of
the Code assumed that parties to a contract respond to breaches in predictable ways.
"Ihe assumption of a contract as an 'end' implicitly underlies several commentators'
approach to the question of election of damages." Id. at 452. Gabriel concludes that
"[tihe law, absent pressing social policies to the alternative, should reflect the actual
expectations and reasonable actions of the people for whom it governs. An expectation
theory of contract achieves this goal." Id. at 454. Although the drafters of the Uniform
Commercial Code attempted to excise the formalistic tenets of the common law of
contracts in order to "mirror actual business practices[,]... one finds that the common
law of contracts underlies the very essence of its rules." Id. at 429. Often the legal
remedy is not in accord with the expectations of the parties. Contracts are construed
according to material facts in existence at the time of the contract, not modified by
future events. Here, one must assume for the sake of argument that the contract was
fair in an ethical sense when made, or at least fair enough to prevent rescission. See
RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (imposing anobligation ofgood faith
and fair dealing in contract performance and contract enforcement); U.C.C. § 1-203
(1977) (same). One may use "the doctrines of misrepresentation and unconscionability
as proxies for deception and unfairness." Eleanor H. Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic
of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 502 (1989) (comparing standards of conduct in
negotiation with court proceedings). Professor Norton describes the proposition that
lawyers negotiate "honestly and in good faith ... and that they refrain from doing
anything unconscionably unfair" as inherently radical. Id. at 514 (citing Alvin B.
Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers: Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577, 593 (1975),
as a supporter of that proposition); see Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh
Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 IOWA L. REV. 503, 508-09 (1991) (citing
Nate's Shoes No. 2 v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990)) (discussing a lender's
liability for bad faith termination of a letter of credit where the bank told the debtor
to "go back to its own neighborhood to obtain financing").
59. But see Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives
from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 599 (1986) (stating that the
dialectical process explains the opposition and connection of ideas); Elizabeth Schneider,
Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 5, 12-13 (1991) (noting that civil
procedure is dynamic, transformative, responsive, and dialectic).
60. Courts have not been persuaded by this argument. See Glopak Corp. v. United
States, 851 F.2d 334, 338 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that a court's authority to deny
enforcement of a contract is "not intended to permit courts to redistribute risks
allocated by differences in bargaining power" (quoting Fraas Surgical Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 571 F.2d 34, 40 (Ct. Cl. 1978))); see generally JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, CONTRACTS §§ 13-17 (3d ed. 1987) (discussing assumption of the risk and techno-
logical impossibility). For a general discussion of how even the best-drafted contracts
can go awry, see Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963), reprinted in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS
OF CONTRACT LAW 4 (Victor P. Goldberg ed., 1989).
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assign fault skillfully but cannot restore the relationship."'
Thus, the difference between lawyerly thinking and the
thinking of other educated people is not merely the absence
of peasant wisdom-which presumably affects both
groups-but the difference between a snapshot and a motion
picture. Because the education of lawyers, based on a still
photo, differs markedly from that of other professions, based
instead on a changing viewpoint,62 it is not surprising that
legal arguments have become less persuasive,' and that our
legal system has become irrelevant to the society that
lawyers presumably serve.'
61. See generally Stephanie Strom, Macy's 16Fateful Days in January, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 1992, at L37 (reporting that Macy's went bankrupt to get out of its junk bond
interest payment obligations); Whither Columbia Gas?, J. COM., Aug. 14, 1991, at 10A
(stating that Columbia Gas System went bankrupt to get out of high prices for gas in
take-or-pay contracts negotiated during the oil embargo of the early 1970s).
62. Lawyers today are a product of rigorous academic training, as opposed to the
mixture of academic and experiential methodology of pre-1970 clerkships. STEVENS,
supra note 9, at 240-42 (quoting ALFRED Z. REED, PRESENT DAY LAW SCHOOLS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA 215 (1928)).
63. See David Margolick, Lawyers: Villains for an Election Year, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 1992, at B1 ("Lawyer-bashing, which the [ABA] once believed to be the preserve
of yahoos, malcontents and zealots, has now reached the country club, to which many
of the A.B.A. types themselves belong."). Charles Beckham, president of the Texas
Young Lawyers' Association, worried that "lawyers are about to become the 'Willie
Horton' of the 1992 Presidential campaign." Id.
64. For example, legal remedies often are irrelevant to victims of abuse because
lawyers fail to obtain the physical protection their clients seek and to others because
legal resolution is too slow to offer practical assistance. See, e.g., Malcolm W. Browne,
Godzilla Meets the FBI, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1992, § 4, at 2 (reporting a dispute over
the ownership of a dinosaur skeleton named "Sue" which was discovered on Sioux tribal
land. "Ofcourse, 65 million years ago, Sue's disputes were resolved far more rapidly.").
Id. Thus, bodyguards and underground networks of safe houses provide a more
meaningful solution than resort to law. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Child Abuse
Rescuer' Is Now the Accused, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1992, at Al (reporting the trial of a
woman who ran an underground network in which children were hidden to prevent
courts from awarding custody or visitation to abusive parents); Russell Baker, Observer:
Going to the Dogs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1992, at L23 (discussing the abandonment at
an Idaho dog track of an 82-year-old man in a wheelchair who could not remember his
name); Don Terry, Failed by Law, Women Seek Bodyguards' Help, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,
1992, at A10 (reporting on battered women not protected by the legal system). But see
Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775 (Wyo. 1987) (holding that the marital exception to a rape
statute was unconstitutional and overruling the common law); People v. Liberta, 474
N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984) (same), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
The interest in alternative dispute resolution grows from an intense public mistrust
of formal legal institutions, the courts, to resolve commercial and personal disputes.
Norton, supra note 58, at 496 n.12. The alternatives to formal adjudication raise the
fundamental question concerning whether "courts have a versatility appropriate for
resolving disputes of all kinds." Id. For example, the Agent Orange litigation involved
over a million plaintiffs and illustrates the difficulty that all-purpose courts have in
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Tax law is an extreme model of a subject with such discor-
dant subtopics that textbook learning becomes a special
challenge.65 The teaching of tax law exemplifies my claim
that a textbook's discrete presentations of learning do not
impart comprehension of an overall concept. Instead, a tax
textbook's linear style of presentation perpetuates a
multiplicity of fragmented concepts. It sets out neither the
prevalent theme, nor even a set of themes, and fails to do so
consistently from the introduction of a new concept to the
disclosure of the final element in a principle of law. Then the
incomplete understanding, by dividing and limiting the
problems that lawyers think of solving, leads to overspecial-
ization and prevents development of an overall tax policy. By
separating technical knowledge from practical issues, the
presentation of tax law constrains the ways in which lawyers
serve their clients.6
Tax law education shows how abstract the legal education
process has become. In general, to learn through a text, one
must isolate concepts67 and make a linear progression from
settling complex disputes. See Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72, In re Agent
Orange Product Liability Litigation, MDL No. 381 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1983). Additionally,
formal adjudication takes too long and costs too much. Norton, supra note 58, at 496.
65. Even the most respected tax professors question what they teach. "The subject
[tax] has just become virtually unteachable. Obviously, we teach something, but we
basically teach a vocabulary, and get people ... so they can learn it on their own."
Christopher H. Hanna, Interview with James S. Eustice, Gerald L. Wallace Professor
of Law, New York University School of Law, 11 A.B.A. SEC. TAX NEWSL. 38,42 (1992)
(quoting Eustice).
66. Consider, by analogy, how divorce lawyers tend to sever clients' emotions from
the litigation. The program that divorce lawyers present to their clients places
marriage in the realm of property. Clients, however, typically see property issues as
inseparable from a broader context of emotion and blame: "Clients ... come to the
divorce process expecting that their emotions will matter and that lawyers will care;
they come away disappointed." Sarat, supra note 9, at 50. There is no consensus
regarding the roles of the lawyer as litigator and as advisor among members of the
practicing bar. This fact is illustrated by the recent American Bar Association debate
concerning Rule 5.7 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted by a narrow
margin in 1991 at its annual meeting and repealed a year later in August 1992. The
controversial rule restricted law firms' ability to control entities, such as consulting
companies, which provide services defined under the rule as ancillary to legal services.
MODELRULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCTRule 5.7 (1991). The standards ofTax Practice
Committee concluded that Rule 5.7 overlaps activities conventionally regarded as
legitimate legal services, especially by attorneys functioning as advisors. Meeting of
Standards of Tax Practice Committee (May 15, 1992) (minutes of the meeting on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
67. LAWYERING SKILLS, supra note 4, at 5-6 (stating that specific skills and values
are interrelated and "cannot be neatly compartmentalized").
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A onward. Only at the end of the progression can one use
the concepts, that is, if one can still rememberA. In order to
understand a single tax concept, the student must examine
first the statute, then the interpretative comments, then the
regulations that the statute engendered, and finally the
cases. Even then, how the fragments of taxation fit together
into the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) may remain
unclear to many students,6 and also to many tax lawyers.69
This serialization forces ideas apart into arrays of special-
ties. Yet this act of specification, this snapshot perspective7'
that appears ordained by the compartmentalization of tax
law's basic elements in the Code, actually descends from the
flat surfaces of pages in a book. The compartmentalization
postpones, and thus hampers, an attempt to unite tax
concepts into a cohesive body of law. The fragments amount
to a mere series of photographs, "a series of fragmented
apostrophes,"71 or digressions in study, "rather than a
cohesive central text."' The progression of incremental
learning ends with a collage rather than an understanding of
a primary concept. To push the analogy further, one might
liken the study of taxation to the representation of objects in
ancient Greco-Roman painting, where objects exist in
68. In particular, a tax student is told that the incomprehensible words of the Code
eventually will have a meaning if they are applied to problems constructed to illustrate
how the statute works (or perhaps to make the statute work). The gap between
applying the tax principle in a narrow factual situation and understanding it as a
principle is difficult to bridge. See generally JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1-4 (7th ed. 1991).
69. Some argue that Congress may have written the Code to remain unclear. See
Tax Reform: A Little List, ECONOMIST, June 14, 1986, at 25 (claiming that tax
exemptions are cunningly built into the "arcane pedantries" of the tax bill); David E.
Rosenbaum, When the Tax Rules Don't Quite Fit, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1986, at A18
(reporting that a tax bill's "Delphic prose" contains 175 special exemptions). "A
[legislative] staff member who worked on the transition rules said he did not know why
they were written in such an obscure way except that 'it's always been done that way. '
Id.
New tax legislation appears to target a neutral class of activities. The targeted
activity is not spread geographically, ethnically, or financially, but protects certain
individuals who fall within the definition of a carefully defined class. The statute,
however, usually does not indicate that it is helping a single family or a particular deal.
Richard L. Dorenberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing
Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 914 (1987).
70. See DUNNING, supra note 25, at 225.
71. I&
72. Id.
FALL 1992] Deconstructing Los Angeles
separate spaces on the canvas.7 3 Like such a painting, each
element of the tax statute is "granted its own separate
perspective." 74  The "postmodernist/post-Cartesian" or
"pluralist viewer" 75 of a painting fails to find a dominant
theme, just as does the lawyer who learns taxation through
the linear method. No central Renaissance perspective
unifies the picture or the subject of taxation. 76  "Our
thinking, our art, our science, and our world view are all
eclectic."
77
A novice and an expert often perceive the same thing
differently.78 An expert art critic sees levels of white in the
painting; similarly, a tax specialist reads layers of meaning
lacquered atop the pure statement of the statute. The
complexity of our tax law limits its understanding to the
aesthete in the same way that the meaning of a work of art
may be explained better by the critic than by the artist.79
73. Id. at 2. "Though they may have been related in content, the painted objects
and figures were not structurally or spatially related to each other or to the background
because they were not drawn as if they were all seen from the same location." Id.
74. Id. at 2.
75. See id. at 213.
76. The result of the omission of a "unified space" was a fragmented image "unlike
the unified image that Renaissance perspective would yield." Id. at 2-3. The law is out
of touch with what nonlawyers call reality. Hence, the problem with law is not that a
legal text contains a paradox, but that legal concepts are limited to ideas that can be
expressed in writing. "Deconstruction thus reveals the antinomibl character of legal
thought, a characterization which is at first disturbing, but in the end is the best
description of our actual experience in using legal concepts." Balkin, supra note 7, at
786.
77. DUNNING, supra note 25, at 213.
78. The meaning of the postmodern painting is "not determined by the artist
because no 'single interpretation can be devised.'" Id. at 229 (quoting Kristin Olive,
David Salle's Deconstructive Strategy, 60 ARTs MAG. 82, 83 (1985)). Similarly, court
opinions interpreting the Constitution have "supplanted" the original text. Collier,
supra note 34, at 217. Furthermore, in visual art, in most creative writing, and in law,
the author assumes that the expression will communicate on its own. With exceptions
such as Woody Allen and Spaulding Grey, most authors do not interpret their own
work. See generally Emily Fowler Hartigan, The Power of Language Beyond Words:
Law as Invitation, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 67 (1991) (explaining the need for the
reader's response to what is written). Allen and Grey are able to control the meaning
of their films because they write and act (and, additionally, Allen directs). See, e.g.,
HUSBANDS AND WIvEs (Tristar 1992); SWIMMING TO CAMBODIA (Lorimar 1987).
79. For example, Congress "signs" the Code, but often does not even read tax bills.
The real authors are task forces drawn from various groups, usually including members
of the House and Senate Committee staff. James B. Lewis, Viewpoint: The Nature and
Role of Tax Legislative History, 68 TAXES 442,444 (1990); Bradford L. Ferguson et al.,
Reexamining the Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing
Realities of the Process, 67 TAXES 804, 820 (1989). Tax legislation is drafted by task
forces representing various governmental interests, including staff members from the
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The expert, with the eye of the connoisseur, 8° sees that the
words of the text are shadowed by a historical context. 81
Thus, finding the plain meaning of the statute from the
words alone is impossible. A common tax proverb advises,
"One should read the Code only if the Committee Report is
unclear."' The tax law is never written on a clean slate.
However, expert interpretation may have dangerous results
in tax. For example, the Treasury Regulations may try to
transcend the words of the Code when interpreting its
meaning. The drafters of the regulations treat the Code's
words ceremonially, and therefore the words lose their literal
meaning because like the phrase "good morning," "everyone
[familiar with the words] knows perfectly well what their
intended meaning is."' It seems that only the educated are
House, the Senate, Joint Committees, the Treasury, and the IRS. The same group
prepares the committee report. Congress, however, does not necessarily read the report
even if it is available before voting. Ferguson et al., supra, at 811-12. According to
Lewis, members receive their information from staff members who answer their
questions orally or occasionally in writing. Lewis, supra, at 444. Thus, the doctrines
of legislative intent are difficult to apply straight-faced to the Code.
80. Cf WASSILY KANDINSKY, CONCERNING THE SPIRITUAL IN ART 49 (M.T.H. Sadler
trans., Dover Publications 1977) (1912) (arguing that "[olur materialistic age has
produced ... a 'connoisseur' ... who is not content to put himself opposite a picture
and let it say its own message ... [and who] does not probe the outer expression to
arrive at the inner meaning").
81. See United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992) (holding that a settlement
award for a racial discrimination claim was not excluded from income because it was
not damages in the historic sense of the term).
82. The authority of legislative history was debated in the Supreme Court recently
when Justice Souter defended its use as the only way to determine meaning against
Justice Scalia's accusation that reliance on legislative history was the "St. Jude [patron
saint of lost causes] of the hagiology of statutory construction." United States v.
Thompson/Center Arms Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2109 n.8 (1992); see also Ferguson et al.,
supra note 79, at 804; Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Pedagogy in the Age of
Statutes, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 227, 231 (1991) ("Although the most frequently used type
of extrinsic legislative history material is a committee report, neither the legislature
as a whole nor even the committee members themselves vote on the report." (footnotes
omitted)).
83. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 97 Tax Ct. Rep. & Mem. Dec.
(Macmillan) f 97.3, at 15 (1991) (overturning a 69-year-old tax regulation). Phillips
Petroleum claimed that the income derived from the sale of liquified natural gas to gas
and electric companies in Tokyo was mixed source income within the meaning of
§ 863(b)(2) of the Code because the gas was personal property produced within and sold
without the United States. Id. at 18. The IRS claimed that the gas was U.S. source
income as defined by Treasury Regulation § 1.863-1(b)(1). Id. Because the two
provisions conflicted on this issue, the court determined that the wording of the statute
preempted the regulations and found for Phillips Petroleum. Id. at 20.
84. Judith Martin, The Latest Word on Polite Phrases, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Apr. 28, 1991, at D8 ('[Tihere is hardly anyone more tedious than the person
whose response to 'good morning' is to argue that it's raining.").
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the Code's intended audience, not unlike the audience of a
painting in Gallery 31 of the Museum of Modern Art.' The
authors of the Blue Book8 also function as its critics.
The functions of the commentator, in the case of tax, and
the critic, in the case of art, are strikingly similar. The tax
student is like the museum-goer who observes that the seem-
ingly blank canvas actually is painted white. Hence, the
museum-goer assumes that the museum object is art, but
relies upon the critic to explain the object's meaning.8 7 At
85. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
86. The Blue Book, published by the staffofthe Joint Committee on Taxation after
the enactment of a tax law, contains an explanation of the law based on the committee
report. "Absent any definitive legislative history that is more revealing, the court
believes it is proper nevertheless, in the absence of any comparable contrary assertion,
to give substantial weight to this Explanation." Ferguson et al., supra note 79, at 820
(quoting Bank of Clearwater v. United States, 85-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) $ 13,606 (Ct.
Cl.)). According to Ferguson, the Blue Book authors occasionally tend to put their own
gloss on the intent of the legislation. Id. Since the critics in this case include some of
the authors of the words of the Code, one may wish to defer to such interpretations as
opposed to Congressional intent. But whether Congress knew enough to form an intent
concerning the meaning of the statute it passed is not an issue because, as a
constitutional and political concept, Congress clearly had the power to enact tax
legislation. See Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of-Statutory
Interpretation: Underenforcement, Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative
Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 767, 769 (1991) (noting how the doctrine of legislative
supremacy in the traditionalist, neotraditionalist, and modernist model of statutory
interpretation variously affects the judiciary). Maltz states that "[a]ny plausible theory
of statutory interpretation must address the concept of legislative supremacy." Id. at
769; cf. Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 170-71 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Silberman,
J., concurring) (discussing deference to regulatory interpretation of tax statutes), affd,
484 U.S. 9 (1987).
Some courts have had no trouble finding the plain meaning of a tax statute. See,
e.g., Estate of Perry v. Commissioner, 927 F.2d 209, 212-13 (5th Cir. 1991) (rejecting
the Commissioner's theory "based on policy and on logic (seldom if ever a consideration
in federal tax statutes)" that the payment of premiums on an insurance policy was a
"transfer" of the policy by the decedent); Grider v. Cavazos, 911 F.2d 1158, 1163 (5th
Cir. 1990) (applying recovery of tax refunds that had been intercepted towards payment
of their defaulted student loans based on the plain meaning of the statute and the
treasury's own regulations). In Grider, the Fifth Circuit failed to find ambiguity in the
word delinquent--a word "universally understood by lawyer and layman alike when
used in reference to a debt." Id. The court disagreed with Jones v. Cavazos, 889 F.2d
1043, 1048-49 (11th Cir. 1989), which interpreted "delinquent" in a Treasury
Regulation according to the legislative history of the regulation: "In the face of such
unambiguous language, how can a court justify usurping the legislative function that
was delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury by supplying words ... to modify
'delinquent'?" Grider, 911 F.2d at 1163.
87. Art is anything that is recognized as art. See Rita Reif, Ask Not 'Is It Art?'Ask
'Did An Artist Make It?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1992, at H37; see also SALVADOR DALI,
LOBSTER TELEPHONE (1936) (telephone made by Dali); MARCEL DUCHAMP, READY MADES
(painting 1914) (depicting telephones, urinals, automobiles, fluorescent lights, and
vacuum cleaners).
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first, one thinks that the sophisticated viewer could clearly
distinguish a work of art from a white fence. But, upon
reflection, one questions whether perhaps the fence, too, is
art, and whether a painting used as a barrier is a fence.8
Academic writers have applied deconstructionist ideas89 of
visual art to literary texts. Because deconstructionists
search for meaning in the words of others, the choice of a
particular work is less important than the interpretation
given to the meaning found in it.9° The lawyer-like task
88. According to Dunning, postmodern painting challenges both the language and
the illusion of painting. "For [postmodernist painters], the painting, like the spoken
word, can function as both signifier and signified." DUNNING, supra note 25, at 228.
Dunning discusses the literary quality of painting and "the relationships among the
reality of the canvas, the sign, and the reality of the sign." Id. Jasper Johns's flag
painting is "a perfect reproduction of a flag." Id. However,
the flag itself is a reproduction (if there can be a reproduction when there is no
original); there exists no "original" flag, though each reproduction maybe [sic]
treated as if it were an original. Such a conspicuous image makes it difficult to
read the painting as nothing but a painting in the sense that a modernist would
expect. Is Johns's flag a painting, or another reproduction, or a reproduction of
a reproduction? What, then, is a reproduction of Johns's painting? The flag is
also a visual metonomy for the United States; it is America. If the flag is such
a metonomy, then is John's painting also a metonomy? The questions that Johns
asks are related to painting as both illusion and language.
Id. at 228-29 (footnote omitted).
Ambiguity engages the viewer in the process of art. For example, in the electronic
music composed by Max Neuhouse, street sounds incorporate the music, and the music
joins the noise of the street. John Rockwell, Beneath the Feet, Art Soothes in Times Sq.,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1987, at B1. Ambiguity in a statute likewise engages the reader
in the process of interpretation. As with the artist, the legislature loses authority to
the interpreter, in this case, the courts. Once Congressional intent is merged with the
document, the power of the author is past. Cf Karla W. Simon, Congress and Taxes:
A Separation of Powers Analysis, 45 U. MIAI L. REV. 1005, 1008 (1991) (arguing that
politics, not courts, should remedy problems with Congress's tax legislation).
89. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
90. Balkin, supra note 7, at 744. Deconstructionist lawyers argue that there is a
hierarchical relationship between what is privileged and what is excluded in legal
thought. Balkin gives an example of deconstruction as "A is the rule and B is the
exception; A is the general case and B is the special case .... Indeed, my labeling of
these ideas as A and B involves a hierarchical move because the letter A precedes B in
the alphabet." Id. at 747. The practice of deconstruction shows that the priority of A
against B is an illusion, for A and B have a mutually dependent relationship. Id.
Text creates a need for a hierarchial structure. Thus, although the particular order
within that structure is sometimes interchangeable, the fact that it is hierarchical does
not change. That is, whether the narrative style is a chronological account or a flash-
back, one always reads a page from top to bottom, one page (or word) before another.
An example of nonhierarchical visual structure is the cartoon animation cell which
consists of transparent layered images rather than pictures arranged sequentially. In
the former, the order in which the pictures are arranged does not matter because
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involves teasing out textual paradoxes 9' without seeming to
laugh. The debate in literature and in law is how much
license an individual reader may take in her interpretation
of the text.92  "[A]nything can mean anything."93 Or, put
another way, "[d]econ-structionism is an interpretive
technique that follows from the view that language itself
contains infinite possibilities of meaning."' In contrast, the
together they form one picture.
in written language systems, "syntax deals only with what we might call the linear
aspect of construction: that is, the ways in which words are put together in a chain to
form phrases and sentences, what in film we call the syntagmatic category." JAMES
MONACO, HOW TO READ A FILM 142 (rev. ed. 1981). However, in film and television,
syntax also includes a spatial component that is developed in both time and space. Id.
In contrast, in language systems one cannot type a new word in the same space as the
original without obliterating the original, and, although two people can speak at once,
most people will not be able to follow either conversation. I& Balkin pinpoints a
frustrating aspect of the deconstruction technique: deconstruction "can displace a
hierarchy momentarily, it can shed light on otherwise hidden dependences of concepts,
but it cannot propose new hierarchies of thought or substitute new foundations."
Balkin, supra note 7, at 786.
91. Balkin, supra note 7, at 786.
92. But see Williams v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 954 F.2d 1070, 1075 (5th Cir.
1992) (Duhd, J., dissenting) ("Unlike the deconstructionists at the forefront of modern
literary [and legal] criticism, the courts [should] still recognize the possibility of an
unambiguous text." (alterations in original) (quoting Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Last Days
Evangelical Ass'n, 783 F.2d 1234, 1238 (5th Cir. 1986))).
In Irion v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 964 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1992), the plaintiffsued
her insurance company for not buying a $440 "full cranial prosthesis" to cover her total
baldness. Id. at 464 n.2. The court rejected the plaintiff's terminology, noting that
"[w]hile we do not mean to diminish Ms. Irion's claim, for simplicity and clarity, we will
refer to Ms. Irion's hairpiece as a wig." Id. The court similarly rejected another
characterization urged by the plaintiff. She argued that the insurer was obligated to
buy the wig because her lost hair was a limb, and the policy covered purchases of
artificial limbs.. Id. at 464. A medical dictionary and Websters dictionary convinced
the court that the plaintiff was wrong. Id. at 464-65.
93. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 525 (1989) (citing Roger Brown, From
the Viewpoint of Psychology: Opening Statement, in STYLE IN LANGUAGE 378, 385
(Thomas A. Sebeok ed., 1960)) (referring to psychoanalysis).
94. Kenneth S. Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory: Some
Common Concerns of an Unlikely Pair, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE 115, 117
n.23 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988). Abraham's argument has a
scientific basis in studies of redundancy. Redundancy used as a device to limit the
meaning of words is at the same time a source of multiple meanings. "[Olrdinary
language contains greater than fifty percent redundancy in the form of sounds or letters
that are not strictly necessary to conveying a message." GLEICK, supra note 14, at 256.
The need for redundancy in ordinary language is caused by the imprecise meaning of
words and the extent to which the speaker and the audience share the same
"knowledge of their language and the world." Ik A computer programmed to generate
two- and three-letter combinations at the same statistical frequency that they occur in
ordinary language can produce "an otherwise random stream of nonsense that is
recognizably English nonsense." Id
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words of the Code are more likely to mean nothing than to
mean many things. 95 Unlike literature, however, in which
the author's meaning need not be concrete or serious,96 the
serious meaning of a tax statute is presumed.97
In a recent tax case, Justice Scalia noted that redundancy was so commonplace that
by itself it would not indicate ambiguity. Scalia found that the provision was merely
another example of 'iteration... obviously afoot." United States v. Thompson/Center
Arms Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2111 (1992) (citing Moskal v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 461,
471 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also Gwen T. Handelman, Zen and the Art of
Statutory Construction: A Tax Lawyer's Account of Enlightenment, 40 DEPAUL L. REV.
611 (1991).
95. Even tax experts do not defend the language of the Code. Professor Griswold
has complained, "[Tihe tax legislation of the 1980s has produced a monstrosity. The
tax statutes are far too complex." Samuel Olchyk, Interview with Erwin N. Griswold,
Former Dean and Langdell Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard Law School, 11 A.B.A.
SEC. TAX NEWSL. 56,59 (1992); see also Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192,206 (1991)
(holding that an airline pilot's honest though unreasonable belief that wages were not
income was not a valid defense to a willful violation of the Code); James S. Eustice, Tax
Complexity and the Tax Practitioner, 8 TAX ADVISER 27, 35 (1977) (arguing that the
practical goal for new tax legislation should be "to strive for a reasonably under-
standable law that can be interpreted without excessive cost relative to the scope of the
transaction involved"); Ferguson et al., supra note 79, at 807 (stating that "the
statutory language ... is virtually incomprehensible to all but the professionals").
96. Discussing the interpretation of literary works, one scholar writes,
Substantive values define the kinds of content an interpreter will think a text (or
author) has "in mind." The objection may be raised that Jane Austen had no
thoughts such as those feminists now read in (or, in this objection, "read into")
her novels. But, of course, feminists answer that Austen need not have been
aware of her indictment of her own society; she need not have put it in terms of
our polemics. Nevertheless, she surely did intend this portrait, even if she
believed, as feminists do not, that this is how things must and even, in part,
should be.
Jessica Lane, The Poetics of Legal Interpretation, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERArURE,
supra note 94, at 278 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988); see also Judith
S. Koeffler, The Feminine Presence in Billy Budd, 1 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 1,
2 (1989) (arguing that Melville intentionally "confuses gender characteristics and
subverts conventions of masculine and feminine ... in order to preserve from the
strangulating gaze of modern industrial society ... the love of men for men").
97. In fact, this may not always be a valid presumption. See Lewis, supra note 79,
at 444 (noting that jokes almost were printed as part of a tax act's legislative history).
According to Lewis, the federal district court in Burns v. United States, 242 F. Supp.
947 (D.N.H. 1965), relied on an unauthorized sentence in a committee report to negate
a Tax Court decision. See Lewis, supra note 79, at 445. Lewis was a member of the
task force that drafted the committee report. S. REP. NO. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
3-5 (1948) (discussing the 1948 estate and gift tax marital deduction and the split gift
legislation). Some jokes are enacted only to be deleted from legislation after almost a
year. See Jack Teuber, Technical Corrections Bill Introduced, 87 TAX NOTES TODAY 113-
1 (June 11, 1987), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File (noting that the
deduction for the purchase of Louisiana State University and University of Texas
football tickets was deleted). Revenue Ruling 84-132 held that payment to a university
in exchange for seats at athletic events was not a charitable gift. See Jack Teuber,
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Written language, whether in the form of a statute or a
literary work, requires interaction by the reader before it can
be applied to a current transaction. To paraphrase Stanley
Fish's general discussion of interpretive authority, the codes
as bodies of knowledge are "inseparable from the practices
[they] enable.""8 In short, any code, from the rules of conduct
in the street to the Constitution, is not a set of self-executing
maxims.99 The Internal Revenue Code must be applied to a
given case, and, by this act of specification, the Code is either
expanded or restricted and "therefore changed."
100
Deconstructionism undermines the enterprise of literate
reasoning. Yet deconstructionists play the game on the
traditional paper field with the same pieces.'"' The problem
with learning from a text is not merely that words are
ambiguous but that words do not embody the underlying
principle. According to the painter David Salle, "[W]e're only
able to say what, in a sense, can be said. We all speak and
think and act within what linguists call the obligatory. "102
An idea and its expression are not coextensive. The
medium of expression, like the skin on a drum, channels
thought so that the expression by the thinker and the idea
itself are not totally alike.'° Generally, the tangible form
reflects some portion less than the whole of the thought.
However, even if that portion were one-hundred percent of
the thought, the expression differs from the idea because its
medium of expression changes it, as the acidity of soil
EnrollingResolutionPasses Senate;HouseAction Uncertain, 86 TAXNOTESTODAY 208-3,
Oct. 17, 1986, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File.
98. FISH, supra note 93, at 151.
99. Id at 150-51. But cf. Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S.
478, 486 (1988) (noting that nonclaim statutes may include a self-executing statute of
limitations barring claims of creditors in probate proceedings).
100. FISH, supra note 93, at 150-51. Fish apparently was describing a peculiarly
American hermeneutic. In the civilian tradition, the statute, rather than the judicial
interpretation of the statute, is the principal authority. Hence, a judicial precedent has
the same persuasive value as the writings of a legal scholar. See generally JOHN H.
MERRYMAN, ThE CImI LAW TRADrmON: AN INmIDuCl10N THLE Sy sEM OF WFSTERN
EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 56, 60 (2d ed. 1985).
101. See MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 13.
102. DUNNING, supra note 25, at 232 n.4; see also DERRIDA, supra note 29, at 50,83
(stating that "we think only in signs" and that language "is absolutely incapable of
accommodating certain forms of modern thought" such as mathematics).
103. Thus, when an idea is expressed, there are two versions of the idea. Cf
Hartigan, supra note 78, at 75 (arguing that "[w]ords will never catch" a new way of
seeing the law).
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changes the flavor of carrots. For example, an idea
expressed by beating a drum is effected as much by the
vibrations of the skin on the drum as by the timing of the
musician. 1°4 Hence, what is thought or known cannot be ex-
pressed exactly in words.
According to Wittgenstein, "Understanding concepts
requires looking at the various activities of which they are a
part.""°5 Several of Magritte's paintings of changes in state
express a similar thought.' °6 However, unlike Magritte and
Wittgenstein, many lawyers tend to focus on words and not
the idea of which the words are only a copy. 10 7 The more
detailed the provision, the less flexible the idea.
Nevertheless, the discrete presentation of knowledge is the
inevitable baggage of literate thought. In a literate society,
one learns the technique of classification in early childhood.
Studies, such as Piaget's, on the process of reasoning and its
development in children, demonstrate that much of our
thought involves a classification of ideas that is consistent
with the scientific method used by biologists in the
classification of animals and plants. 108 The transfer of this
process from concrete analysis (for example, one physically
looks at, smells, touches, dissects-the plant) to more
abstract learning (for example, one verbalizes an entirely
abstract concept-a corporation) produces a distinctive
method of reasoning (logic) based upon matching physical
and functional characteristics. This method of reasoning
creates serious deficiencies in the study of law.
The process of dividing or categorizing information by
physical similarities or other shared properties (superordin-
ate groupings) leads to the development of abstract thought,
104. The idea would sound different if it were expressed as words instead of rhythm
and differ still more if the idea were painted on canvas. The expression itself cannot
help but change like the individual rendition of a repeated pattern done by hand. But
that does not mean that the idea has changed.
105. Patterson, supra note 28, at 361 (paraphrasing Wittgenstein).
106. See Rene Magritte, Lifeline, in L'INVENTION COLLECTIVE No. 2 (Apr. 1940),
reprinted in GABLIK, supra note 50, at 183; RENE MAGRITTE, CLAIRVOYANCE (painting 1936)
(depicting an egg posing for the portrait of a bird); RENE MAGRITME, DISCOVERY (painting
1927) (depicting a woman changing from flesh to wood); RENE MAGRITrE, NAPOLEON'S
MASK (painting 1935) (depicting a funeral mask combined with the motion of clouds and
sky).
107. Analyzing text rather than ideas results in a text that is closer not to the
original idea but to a copy of the degraded image copied from a copy of a copy rather
than from the master work.
108. See supra note 51.
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including the development of legal principles. Such abstract
thinking, however, limits the kinds of problems that the
judicial system itself can solve.'0 9 Superordinate categories
do not address the relationship between different groups.
For example, systematic, abstract thinking groups cats and
tigers closer together (as felines) than it groups cats and
mice, even though experiential thinking combines the latter
two more easily than the former two. The cat-mouse type of
concrete, real-world relationship is outside the categories
used in abstract, literate reasoning.
Russian psychologist Alexander Luria compared the
thought processes of preliterate peasants in Uzbekistan with
those of educated people in various other societies. He found
that preliterate individuals organized thought and answered
questions in a fundamentally different way than those with
even a minimal formal education." 0 During a classification
test, the experimenter showed the subject four picture
cards-three adults and a child-and casually said it was
obvious that "the child doesn't belong in this group." But the
peasant disagreed. "Oh, but the boy must stay with the
others. All three of them are working, you see, and if they
have to keep running out to fetch things, they'll never get the
job done; but the boy can do the running for them."
Similarly, "[a]sked to pick from a set of three objects-a saw,
a log, and an ear of grain-the one that goes with an ax and
a sickle, another subject replied, 'If you want them to be the
same, you'd have to pick the ear of wheat. A sickle reaps
grain, so this ear will be plucked by this sickle.""" Luria
found that his subjects had a "general insensitivity to
abstract forms of classification, a resistance to reasoning
through language." 2 This changed with minimal exposure
109. See KANDINSKY, supra note 80, at 12 (noting that material classification relates
to the past and not to the future, which has no material existence). According to
Kubler, "We can grasp the universe only by simplifyring it with ideas of identity by
classes, types and categories, and by rearranging the infinite continuation of non-
identical events into a finite system of similitudes." GABLIK, supra note 50, at 143
(quoting GEORGE KUBLER, THE SHAPE OF TIME 67 (1962)). Events do not repeat, "but it
is in the nature of thought that we understand events only by the identities we imagine
among them." Id. (quoting KUBLER, supra, at 67).
110. HOWARD GARDNER, ART, MIND & BRAIN 342-44 (1982).
111. Id. at 343.
112. Id.
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to school.
With the advent of the Children's Television Workshop,
many of us as very young children learned that "[o]ne of
these things is not like the others,"' that is to classify into
"superordinate" general categories such as "toys" and
"clothes.""" Perhaps these are categories that will fit easily
on a printed page.
Cognitive anthropologists recognize that different modes of
communication foster different ways of thinking because they
"involve developments in the storing, analysis, and creation
of human knowledge, as well as the relationships between
the individuals involved."" 5 According to Jack Goody, the
acquisition of "writing, and more especially alphabetic
literacy," is one of those developments that significantly
affects the way-users think."' Texts permit greater scrutiny
than oral statements and therefore encourage an "increase in
scope of critical activity, and hence of rationality, skepticism,
and logic."" 7 They also encourage abstraction by allowing
the content of knowledge to be expressed through other than
face-to-face exchanges and by relieving the burden of memo-
rization:
No longer did the problem of memory storage domi-
nate man's intellectual life; the human mind was
freed to study static "text" (rather than be limited by
participation in the dynamic "utterance"), a process
that enabled man to stand back from his creation
and examine it in a more abstract, generalized, and
"rational" way. By making it possible to scan the
communications of mankind over a much wider time
113. 9
JON STONE & JOSEPH RAPOSO, One of These Things (1970 Jonico Music, Inc.) (sheet music
on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); see also MARTHA MINOW,
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 1-4 (1990) (discussing how the classification game played on
Sesame Street is the first step to thinking like a lawyer).
114. See GARDNER, supra note 110, at 343. Magritte attacked the ambiguity of
conventional classification models by painting The Fright Stopped, depicting a bowler
hat with a medicine label, "For External Use Only," as well as by mislabeling common
shapes and labeling amorphous shapes with concrete nouns. See GABLIK, supra note 50,
at 142-43.




span, literacy encouraged, at the very same time,
criticism and commentary on the one hand and the
orthodoxy of the book on the other." 8
Goody concludes that literacy "encourages special forms of
linguistic activity associated with developments in particular
kinds of problem-raising and problem-solving, in which the
list, the formula and the table played a seminal part."" 9
These devices permitted previously impossible systematizat-
ions of knowledge, which became the foundation of logic12O_
and of law.'2 At a more advanced stage of education, law
school relies on interpreting statutes and appellate opinions,
and the distilled theory of an actionable claim is severed
from the transaction and the people it affects in real life. As
a result, one often finds not only that a statute is misinter-
preted, but that whole sections of it may be repeated verba-
tim by one who misses its application in an actual case.
The students' loss gets passed on to society. The search for
statutory meaning from the configuration of words in a linear
format has logical as well as mechanical limitations in the
choice of remedies-usually money-that the courts offer.
These remedies often do not provide litigants with a
satisfying solution to their problem. In an appellate case,
human conflict is merely tangential to the abstract issues of
the law. The causes of conflict, and the aftermath of the
118. Id (footnote omitted).
119. Id at 162.
120. Id. at 44.
121. A more recent attempt to find differences in cognitive processes is Don Le Pan's
argument concerning average people in the Middle Ages. See 1 DON LE PAN, THE
COGNFIVE REVOLIION IN WESTERN CuLTURE: THE BIRTH OP EXPECTATION (1989). Le Pan
argues that they were unable to form expectations (as moderns do) because they lacked
understandings of causal probability and temporal objectivity. Le Pans survey of
medieval English literature leads him to conclude that, in this respect, most people
then employed cognitive processes similar to those observed by psychologists in children
of the modern era and recognized as qualitatively different from the cognitive processes
of modern adults. Id. at 76. For this reason, medieval literature and histories tend to
be arranged paratactically in single-strand narratives. Only with the development of
an expectative faculty could writers exceed simple parataxis and begin to elucidate
causal connections, or grasp the concept of simultaneity. The acquisition of those
abilities is the foundation for the more complex narratives that began to emerge in
Elizabethan England, Le Pan argues. Id. Le Pan does not limit his argument just to
stories that developed primarily in an oral tradition-he also considers texts, such as
histories, that first emerged in written form. Yet, as Goody notes, writing, not just
"extensive literacy," produces the consequences he discussed. See GOODY, supra note
115, at 151-53.
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solution (perhaps continued conflict), generally are not
relevant to the holding of the case." Because of this, the
context in which the legal principles operate and the
problems that legal solutions cause generally are not part of
the education of lawyers.123 Law schools have failed "to train
lawyers to be sensitive and responsive in their dealings with
clients."12 This failure "has important consequences for the
legal system as a whole.""2
In tax statutes and cases, human disputes are strained
through the impersonal rules of law so as to be nearly
unrecognizable to common understanding. 126  The law ab-
stracts real activities and vacuously describes them as
contracts and property rights. Worse still, tax law then
distorts the abstractions. As described by Plato, one may
"imagine men ... living in an underground cave-like
dwelling place ... with their neck [sic] and legs in fetters, so
that they remain in the same place and can only see ahead
of them." 7 The sunlight at the entrance to the cave is a long
way off. Light comes from a fire. The men can see only the
shadows of themselves and each other. "[S]uch men would
believe the truth to be nothing else than the shadows of the
122. Sometimes final settlement eludes the litigants. For example, in the first of
the series of Galler cases, the court held that various provisions of a shareholder's
agreement were valid and gave the plaintiff the right to an accounting of all money
earned by the corporation in order to determine what money was owed her. Galler v.
Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 587 (111. 1964). Subsequent cases enforced other aspects of the
agreement. See Galler v. Galler, 217 N.E.2d 111, 113 (111. App. Ct. 1966) (dismissing
an appeal from an order directing that a meeting of shareholders be held and that
designated persons be elected directors); Galler v. Galler, 238 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1968) (affirming an order establishing salaries for 1966 and later years); Galler v.
Galler, 316 N.E.2d 114, 121 (111. App. Ct. 1974) (affirming orders that two of the
corporation's officers repay excessive salaries plus interest from the period 1956-65),
aff'd, 336 NE.2d 886 (111. 1975).
123. The profession long has been seen as exacerbating human conflict. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, se. 2 ("Ft, let's
kill all the lawyers.").
124. Sarat, supra note 9, at 43.
125. Id. Sarat, writing about antagonism between lawyers and clients in divorce
cases, notes that the clients "insist that lawyers attend to issues beyond those that are
technically relevant, and they often regard lawyers' resistance to those issues as
insensitive or iapprpriate." kd at 47.
126. Adalberto Jordan, Imagery, Humor, and the Judicial Opinion, 41 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 693, 700 (1987) ("Law aggrandizes the dispute with the use of such lifeless terms
as 'cause of action' and litigation,' and enshrines an otherwise human problem in a
formal legal setting.").
127. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 168 (G.M.A. Grube trans., Hackett Publishing 1974) (circa
380 B.C.).
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artifacts."'2 Like Plato's imagined men, lawyers see only the
shadows of their clients' transactions; the tax lawyers stand
at the deepest end of the cave, seeing no shadows but hearing
the stories told by those lawyers who do. They see neither
real events nor even the law's shadow of the event. As a
result, tax solutions have the greatest degree of distortion in
relation to an actual occurrence.
The creation of tax concepts based on Plato's admonition
that one would be "imitating" the intelligible by looking "at
actual living creatures, then at the actual stars, and finally
at the actual sun,"1" continues the classic duality between
theory and action. However, the primacy of theory free of all
empirical sensual experience (characterized by a lawyer-like
attempt to use knowledge gleaned from Socratic dialogue)
has not led to the realization of Plato's ideal world. Lawyers
have not come near to "the final goal of the intelligible as the
prisoner escaping from the cave reached the final goal of the
visible." 3 ° Instead, the development of tax theory divorced
from action produces a system of legal reasoning based on
the theoretical values that fetter the working lives of people
involved in production and commerce.'
31
Consequently, the flaws in thought caused by the study of
law are carried into a simple and even predictable pattern of
action. When solutions to basic social problems are
attempted through the enactment of laws, new problems
result.'32 Through tax law, government discourages certain
activities by adding to their cost or by encouraging a
variation in the pattern of activity. Eventually, lawmakers
128. Id.
129. Id at 183.
130. Id.
131. The action of the "real world" and "the actual effects of law on people" were,
according to Langdell, irrelevant to the "ultimate answers to all legal questions."
Collier, supra note 34, at 200. In contrast, feminist scholars do "research out of books
[and] ... legal research with people." Lucinda Finley, Feminist Jurisprudence, 1
COWM. J. GENDER & L. 5,21 (1991) (speaking as a panelist during Myra Bradwell Day
at Columbia Law School). The feminist movement starts with practice, then moves to
theory: "Feminism was a practice long before it was a theory." MacKinnon, supra note
7, at 14. The arguments that won cases concerning sexual harassment and sex
discrimination under civil rights law "were based on the plaintiffs' lives as women." Id.
at 15.
132. Randy E. Barnett, The Function of Several Property and Freedom of Contract,
9 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 62 (1992) (discussing how the concepts of several property and
freedom of contract address some categories of social problems while creating others).
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reform the law to impose a tax on the variation, or shift the
incidence of tax to different activities. The cycle of
amendment is a cycle of problems, solutions, and new
problems.1" A change in the Code, for instance, is difficult
to explain in a written text because it has diverse
ramifications. A change in one section may affect other
sections. The effect may be obvious and direct, or it may be
obscure and indirect, intended or not."
A change to the Code temporarily disturbs the balance
accommodated by the entrenched law. The effect is much
like the continuous repositioning of balls in a pool game.
One ball propels another ball, which affects the configuration
of the balls on the table and which, in turn, affects the
strategy of both the player and his opponent. A single
change in the tax law can cause disturbances in many other
areas and can impede the understanding of any given topic
of taxation.13
Even if one could master the technical knowledge, this
achievement alone would not carry with it a full
understanding of how the law works. Randy Barnett
denominates "the problems of knowledge, of interest, and of
power"" as the motive forces behind laws. However, the
interplay of knowledge, interest, and power is not apparent
from the casebook problems... drawn from appellate cases,
133. See, e.g., Jason DeParle, In New Social Era, Moynihan Sees "New" Social Ills,
,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1991, at A13 (noting that welfare causes its own problem of
dependency); Rosenbaum, supra note 69, at A18 (discussing a case where a senator
helped five doctors from Rochester, N.Y. with tax breaks on medical research revenues).
134. James S. Eustice, A Case Study in Technical Tax Reform: Section 361, or How
Not to Revise a Statute, TAX NOTES, Apr. 20, 1987, at 283 (discussing 10 interpretative
difficulties resulting from the 1986 amendments to § 361 of the Code).
135. It seems that as soon as one learns the solution in the Code, one learns that
the solution creates another problem. Statements constantly must be revised. To state
an opinion safely, one learns to speak in parentheticals instead of clear statements.
Thus, one must plan business transactions on the assumption that the tax law will
not penalize a particular action in the future. For example, the tax deduction on
interest charges was limited severely in 1986. I.R.C. § 163(h) (1988) (eliminating
deduction for consumer interest). This change hurt many debtors. In response to this
change, law firms tried to protect their clients by influencing transition rules to exempt
a particular transaction from the effect of the new law. For a discussion of how tax
exemptions often cater to a particular person, see supra note 69.
136. Barnett, supra note 132, at 64.
137. The student is told to solve a hypothetical problem by reading the words of the
statute without any real comprehension of how it works. At this stage, solving the tax
problem is like solving a puzzle. The solution of the puzzle may bring the student
satisfaction. Learning how to solve tax puzzles, however, is not learning to integrate
Deconstructing Los Angeles
the Code, and the regulations. The interplay of knowledge,
self-interest, and power in the individual player is hidden in
the history of the text.'" In the real world-which is not
limited, constricted, or contorted by the rules of
evidence-the concepts of self-interest and power are insepa-
rable from technical knowledge. Nonetheless, traditional
texts exclude self-interest and power 13 9 at the onset of the
acquisition of knowledge. This omission leads to difficulty in
pairing theory with its application. Instead, the focus is on
technical knowledge itself.
The abstract terminology of the Code aims at mathematical
precision rather than human truth. The fact that two and
two are four, or that three and one also are four, will not
explain who selected those elements or why he did so. 140
Learning taxation through the examination of technical
knowledge explains how, and perhaps when, but not who,
what, or where.
The focus on technical knowledge, to the exclusion of power
and self-interest, results in a scattered view of taxation
where each principle forms a discrete concept. Moreover,
because self- interest and power are not part of the initial
study of taxation, policy and technical knowledge become
the issues of technical knowledge, interest, and power. The law student, like Grover
from Sesame Street, learns to count six apples but cannot count oranges. The broad tax
concepts of self-interest and power get lost in the details of the statute.
138. In a court, one is bound by the rules of evidence which do not permit the self-
interest and the power of someone other than the plaintiff or the defendant as evidence.
In addition, information which is dramatic may be kept out of a trial because it is
prejudicial and inflammatory, or sometimes because the evidence would surprise the
other side. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
139. Barnett, supra note 132, at 65.
140. For example, a seemingly neutral question is whether the taxpayer has income
or a tax liability. Numerous commentators have pointed out, however, that the benefi-
ciary of a particular tax rule generally is not identified in terms of self-interest and
power (nor by age, religion, social class, sex, or marital status). See, e.g., Babette
Barton, Economic Fables! Tax Related Foibles, 45 TAX L. REV. 471 (1991); Richard C.E.
Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several Liability for Income Taxes
Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317 (1990) (stating that both earner and
nonearner spouses are liable for the tax owed on a joint return); Beverly I. Moran, One
Tax Piece of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Can the Federal Home Loan Bank Board Use
the Internal Revenue Code to Bail Out the Ailing Savings and Loan Industry?, 22 U.
TOL. L. REV. 351 (1991); Toni Robinson & Mary Moers Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent
at Tax Time: Marital Status as a Tax Determinant, 8 VA. TAX REV. 773 (1989)
(reviewing the effect of marital status on tax liability); Camilla E. Watson, Broken
Promises Revisited: The Window of Vulnerability for Surviving Spouses Under ERISA,
76 IOWA L. REV. 431 (1991) (discussing the discriminatory effect on gender of facially
neutral marriage proposals).
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disengaged. The study of policy is a separate block of
knowledge in the continuum of study. Because of the time it
takes to read the texts of statutes and commentary, the
technical mastery of the tax law and its economic or social
policy become artificially separated blocks of knowledge.
The value of visual images as educational tools, whether
simple drawings and props, or the multiple images and
sounds composing a video, is established clearly. 141 Pictures
predate written text in education;" even the Socratic style
accommodates vivid images 143 and figures.'"
Video tapes can be valuable, but not necessarily neutral,
educational tools. Video combines the elements of sound and
story with disparate elements of visual art-color, 145 light,
141. A growing body of empirical evidence supports the use of pictures for teaching
at higher levels of education. 'The two major media for communicating scientific
information to students are words and pictures. In spite of the traditional bias toward
verbal over visual forms of instruction, a growing research base suggests that text
illustrations can have important effects on student learning." Richard E. Mayer & Joan
K. Gallini, When Is an Illustration Worth Ten Thousand Words?, 82 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL.
715, 715 (1990); see also William H. Kenety, Observations on Teaching Trial Practice,
41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 263, 267 (1991) ("1 teach trial practice students to use visual aids as
much as possible.").
142. For example, young children learn to read, that is, follow sequences, through
picture books.
143. PLATO, supra note 127, at 168-70.
144. PLATO, THE MENO, reprinted in MUSINGS ON THE MENo 42-50 (John E. Thomas
trans., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1980) (circa 386 B.C.).
145. Colors help to communicate the basic knowledge of human experience. RUDOLF
ARNHEIM, The Rationalization of Color, in NEW ESSAYS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ART, supra
note 16, at 205, 212. The pattern of colors in a picture or a field of vision shows
relationships: "the ways in which the things of the world belong together and stay
apart, their ways of building, combining and separating, of need and spurning one
another." Id at 211-12. Arnheim refers to the untitled 1832 sketch of a triangle made
by the artist Eugene Delacroix wherein the three primary colors (red, yellow, and blue)
face the three secondary colors (orange, green, and purple). The colors seem to reach
out toward each other. Id. In Titian's painting, Diana in Her Bath, the two principle
figures are linked across a large space by the use of the color red. Id. at 209. A totally
different feeling was expressed by Mondrian's use of color. In Mondrian's paintings,
the primary palette "express[es] total independence, total distinction, and, through the
lack of relation, also a total absence of dynamics; he reserve[s] the dynamics of relation
to the interplay of his shapes." Id. at 209-10; see PIET MONDRIAN, BROADWAY BOOGIE-
WOOGIE (painting 1942-43) (depicting yellow, red, and blue squares and rectangles on
a white background).
Color is capricious, changing in moving from daylight to tungsten light, fading, and
depending significantly on the color next to it. ARNHEIM, supra, at 205-07 (discussing
the unreliability of color). As Arnheim notes:
In a painting by Matisse the deep purple of a robe may owe much of its saturated
redness to a green wall or skirt bordering on it, whereas in another area of the
painting the same robe loses much of its redness to a pink pillow or even looks
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sculpture, architecture, 4 " and movement. Communication
may occur without text or simultaneously with the text.
However, the camera is not neutral147 and causes distortion
in two principal ways. First, one sees only where the camera
points. Even if one questions the location, one cannot
quite bluish in response to a bright yellow corner. Depending on what local
association one is looking at, one sees a different color.
Id. at 208; see also JOSEF ALBERS, INTERACTION OF COLOR 76-77 (Yale Univ. rev. pocket ed.
1975) (explaining that the identical shade of red next to white and next to black will
appear dissimilar to the human eye).
At the primary level, certain colors have "fixed meanings" dictated by culture.
ARNHEIM, supra, at 209; see also MANLIO BRUSATIN, A HISTORY OF COLORS 44-45 (Robert H.
Hopcke & Paul Schwartz trans., 1991) (stating that blue is a symbol of the promised
kingdom to Christians and that green is a sign of the new community of believers).
Goethe believed that "[shingle colors affect us, as it were, pathologically, carrying us
away to particular sentiments." ARNHEIM, supra, at 210 (quoting Johann Wolfgang von
Goethe, Der Farbenlehre didaktischer Teil). Colors have strong emotional impact.
The nature of color itself, however, still eludes science. Based on his experiment of
a prism breaking white light into rays of colors ranging the spectrum, Newton theorized
"that the colors corresponded to frequencies ... in proportion to the speed of the
vibrations." GLEICK, supra note 14, at 164. To a modern physicist, red is 'light
radiating in waves between 620 to 800 billionths of a meter long." Id.
Although novelists have used verbal references to colors, the references do not
communicate color in a way comparable to moving visual technicolor images. In a novel
by Toni Morrison, the character Baby Suggs, hovering between life and death, "used the
little energy left her for pondering color. Bring a little lavender in, if you got any.
Pink, if you don't. And Sethe would oblige her with anything from fabric to her own
tongue." Robin West, Communities, Texts, and Law: Reflections on the Law and
Literature Movement, I YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 129, 143 (1988) (quoting TONI MORRISON,
BELOVED 3-4 (1987)). Toni Morrison uses the tongue to allow the reader to infer the
kindness and ingenuity of a character. The tongue does not signify color traits, but
character traits.
Color has different functions in print and in pictures. In the movie Batman Returns,
we see Cat Woman lick Batman. BATMAN RETURNS (Warner Brothers 1992). In Beloved,
however, the image of color is disembodied; although we may recall the shape and
shade of the tongue, we do not imagine its surroundings and hence its intensity.
Although the color pink signifies the tongue and its primitive role as a sensory organ,
the pink tongue is also what is signified. It appears muted in contrast to Cat Woman's
blood red lipstick and to the black costumes of the principal characters. The identical
monochromatic color of the costume shows the connection of the characters. Even
though both the movie and the novel are narratives, the movie director cannot avoid
the literal significance of color.
146. See Betsy Sharkey, Anton Furst: Lost in the Dream Factory, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
16, 1992, § 2, at 1, 18 (quoting a description of the film designers belief that film is
multidimensional).
147. The evidentiary aspects related to using video at a trial are beyond the scope
of this Article. Videotapes, however, are widely accepted as evidence. See People v.
Fondal, 546 N.Y.S.2d 26 (App. Div.) (allowing the use of a videotape of defendants
shoplifting), appeal denied, 75 N.Y.2d 770 (1989). For a general discussion of the
evidentiary rules applicable to visual evidence, see 3 SCOTr, supra note 11,
§§ 1294-1333.
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question the viewpoint in a larger sense because the compo-
nent aspects of video-lighting, sound, focus, and
scale"s-are all unconscious cues. Second, dramatic
presentation causes distortion. At best, such distortion can
represent truth in an abstract or poetic sense, rather than in
a literal sense149-what some call the "higher truth.""5 Some
commentators believe that this type of distortion is
inherently necessary to keep the viewer's attention. "Absent
an extreme situation, the holder in due course doctrine is
just not going to be great entertainment, not even in L.A."'51
148. See LAszLo MOHOLY-NAGY, THE NEW VISION (photograph 1925-26) (depicting the
subject's outstretched hand close to the camera, which appears much larger than her
head, which is further from the camera); see also ARNHEIM, supra note 44, at 85 (stating
that a spectator cannot use past experience to judge what he sees).
149. See Gregory R. Naron, With Malice Toward All: The Political Cartoon and the
Law of Libel, 15 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 93, 103 (1990).
150. KANDINSKY, supra note 80, at 9 (arguing that the internal truth can be ex-
pressed only in art); Isidore Silver, Libel, the "Higher Truths" of Art, and the First
Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1066 (1978); see also ROGER & ME (Warner
Brothers 1989) (presenting the closing of a General Motors plant in Flint, Michigan in
documentary format and taking some poetic license in depicting the chronology of
events).
What is truth depends on one's vision of the world and of the legal system. See
generally Anthony Chase, An Obscure Scandal ofConsciousness, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
105, 121 (1988) (noting that truth should not be confused with realism); Robin West,
Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 145 (1985) (arguing that the four schools of jurisprudence correspond to "core
myths" of literature). West describes the connection between romance and natural
law, irony and legal positivism, comedy and liberalism, tragedy and statism in a
comparison of legal theory with literature:
The narrative visions that recur in legal theory lead us to focus upon ourselves
and the possibilities we envision for ourselves in a way that strict empiricism
does not allow. The narrative vision in legal theory helps us understand our own
internal experience of the real world and our idealistic hopes for it. At its best,
the descriptive component of the narrative in legal theory can lead us to reexam-
ine our initial experiences of authority, to reassess our early reactions to
relationships based on reason and power, and to formulate a wiser, more self-
reflective vision of the future moral possibilities of the law.
Id. at 210; cf. Chase, supra, at 106 (stating that the four voices of legal writing include
the professional, critical, scholarly, and human). The distinction between this Article
and others dealing with the narrative is that the subject here is not a literary
narrative, but a visual communication. In his article, Chase treats movies as a form
of popular culture that may be criticized in accordance with literary theories.
151. Stephen Gillers, Taking L.A. Law More Seriously, 98 YALE L.J. 1607, 1608
(1989) (arguing that distortion is necessary to motivate the public to consider moral-
legal issues). However, one should not underestimate the sex appeal of human greed,
or the potential to use the law itself as a character in a video drama. Id. at 1611.
Commercial television programs such as L.A. Law use the crafts of acting and
storytelling to entertain. Id. at 1619. The same crafts should be used to teach law.
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The video's potential for distortion also is its source of
strength for teaching. The narrow, flat field of focus of the
video recorder enhances learning in several ways: by
demonstrating step-by-step comprehension of legal concepts;
by distinguishing an -essential tax principle from its myriad
applications; and by giving the viewer a common experience
to replace the lost consensus of a prior generation.15 2  In a
multicultural society, video creates a common experience, a
shared reference point for a diverse group."a  Perhaps,
because the pulsating dots that create the picture on a
television monitor replicate the blinking pattern of human
vision, one remembers television as the recollection of an
event witnessed in person."
A video that presents dramatized hypotheticals offers an
alternative to textbook learning, and not merely because it
presents information in a memorable-because interrelated-
context."s Visual thinking differs from the dramatization of
152. Collier, supra note 34, at 201 (quoting Edward White as commenting that the
length of law review articles "may be due in part to a collapse of consensus"); see also
GARDNER, supra note 110, at 239 (arguing that television is a "self-contained experience"
dominated by the visual component).
153. Furthermore, video and computer exercises permit students to learn at an
individual pace. Surprisingly, there are few scientific studies of how normal children
and adults learn from watching television. Most studies, however, show that people
have better short-term memory of events learned from television than from other
means of communication. The studies of long-term memory are inconsistent. See, e.g.,
W. James Potter, Perceived Reality in Television Effects Research, 32 J. BROADCASTING
& ELECTRONIC MEDIA 23, 36 (1988) (criticizing assumptions used in research, including
an assumption of a linear relationship among variables in mass-media research); John
Stauffer et al., Recall and Learning from Broadcast News: Is Print Better?, 25 J. BROAD-
CASTING 253 (1981) (noting that a college student's recall from television and print are
similar but significantly higher than from audio sources). See generally MARSHA KINDER,
PLAYING WITH POWER IN MOVIES, TELEVISION AND VIDEO GAMEs 9-10, 101-08 (1991)
(analyzing the effects on the players of adventure stories and games that use inherently
masculine symbols of power such as wands).
154. See WILLIAM C. WEES, LIGHT MOVING IN TIME: SIUDIES IN THE VISUAL AESTHETICS
OF AVANT-GARDE FILM 86-88 (1992). Most of us are not aware of the act of"seeing as a
physiological, nerve-centered event before it becomes a conscious recognition of labeled
and familiar objects and events." Id. at 85. The process of seeing made visible by Stan
Brakhage in films such as Sirius Remembered apparently includes periods of blurred
retinal images and darkness which are caused by each blink and generally are ignored
"and rendered invisible in the conventional visual world." Id. at 86.
155. William W. Patton, Opening Students' Eyes: Visual Learning Theory in the
Socratic Classroom, 15 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 1-18 (1991) (discussing innovations in
teaching torts to first-year students). The first innovation Patton suggests is the use
of diagrams--geometric organizers, as visual mnemonic devices"-in order to help
students organize their knowledge. Id. at 4. Such organizers are useful because they
combat the common failure of students to achieve "an organized, large-scale conceptual
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a legal issue or "the facts" in a brief. The visualization of tax
concepts develops ideas in the filmic tradition of the silent
era of motion pictures, rather than in a dramatic tradition
developed from Homer and Shakespeare. 1"6 The visualization
of ideas forces one to look for an essential feature of the
subject157 and to observe how the subject relates to the
general flow of transactions which are significant for tax
purposes.158
Let us start with "basis," an elemental concept in
individual taxation. 5 9 Understanding the term is necessary
to further learning of fundamental tax principles, including,
for example, how property transfers are taxed. However,
basis is, in essence, merely a tool for determining gain or
loss. Like the ideal concept of twoness, basis has no real,
tangible existence. Thus, it also must be defined in terms of
and analytical model." Id. at 3. The second is to pose discussion of a legal concept
(Patton uses the intentional infliction of emotional distress) in terms of a board game.
Id. at 7-10.
156. In general, dramatic works, such as Shakespeare's, are 80% dialogue and 20%
action; film is the opposite. Television is divided equally between action and words,
with the exception of soap opera, which is 80% dialogue. Interview with Lynda Myles,
playwright and former script writer for Santa Barbara, in New York, N.Y. (July 1,
1992). Arnheim states that, although unnoticed by most audiences, stage art is unnatu-
ral and stylized "because the actors never stop talking." ARNHEIM, supra note 44, at 76.
On the other hand, film portrays abstract ideas in terms of concrete images rather than
words and in this respect appears more natural. Id. at 122. For example, a pistol shot
may become visible in the rapid "rising of a flock of birds." Id. at 93.
157. For example, in The Gold Rush, Charlie Chaplin eats his boots:
Elegantly and with perfect table manners he carves his unusual dish-he lifts off
the upper so that the sole with the nails sticking up in it is left like the backbone
of a fish from which the meat has been removed; he carefully sucks the nails as
if they were chicken bones, and winds the laces round the fork like spaghetti.
ARNHEIM, supra note 44, at 122. The essential shape of the boot and its representation
of poverty are clear. The scene is comic because it takes on the viewpoint of the
wealthy. Id. at 122-23.
158. For a picture of tax concepts, see JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX 282 (1989)
(showing the burden of excise taxes in economic theory graphically). Visualization is
more common in other areas of law such as evidence. See Neil B. Cohen, Confidence
in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Inperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 385 (1985) (applying graphic presentation of laws of probability to evidence);
Richard D. Friedman, Route Analysis of Credibility and Hearsay, 96 YALE L.J. 667
(1987) (using an algebraic-graphic technique to analyze issues of credibility and
hearsay).
159. See generally DOUGLAS A. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX 14-15 (1990); Glen A.
Kohl, The Identification Theory of Basis, 40 TAX L. REV. 623 (1985) (stating that basis
identifies the portion of a taxpayer's wealth that will be exempt from taxation in the
future).
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its function. The basis is always a number to be subtracted
to determine gain. It is the maximum amount a taxpayer
can receive without recognizing gain.1' ° To paraphrase one
commentator, "to fully understand the function" of basis, one
must understand the situations or problems in which it
arises; understanding these problems will lead to an
understanding of the function of basis. 1
6 1
There are several distinct methods of determining basis. 162
Therefore, in order to illustrate the function of basis and how
basis must be defined, one must introduce a second, ancillary
concept: an individual variety of basis, such as cost basis or
gift basis. In order to learn the concept of basis, one must do
three things at once: (1) comprehend its essential,
unchanging quality as a number that is subtracted from the
amount realized in order to calculate gain or loss for tax
purposes (that is, learn its function); (2) understand that its
particular numerical value in a given problem is determined
in a variety of ways, only one of which is the correct basis to
apply in the specific context of the problem (that is, learn
several definitions); and (3) although it contradicts all sense
of logic, accept that the economic or financial stakes of the
real world are not relevant to the process (that is, learn that
tax has its own internal logic" ).
Thus, learning the tax concept of basis through conven-
tional linear or textual presentation involves not only
isolating tax theory from prior life experience, but also
learning several component parts of the concept as separate
blocks of knowledge and then reintegrating these components
into an understanding of basis. The process is like trying to
discover the taste of cinnamon toast by ingesting butter first,
then cinnamon, then toast, and finally sugar. Of course, one
will not find the combined taste by examining one layer at a
time. Trying to learn basis that way is almost as absurd.
But that is the way that basis is taught. The conventional
teaching process generally includes readings in the statutes,
160. See KAHN, supra note 159, at 14.
161. Barnett, supra note 132, at 63-64.
162. KAHN, supra note 159, at 15.
163. DODGE, supra note 158, at 20 (stating that "the internal logic of tax is 'basis').
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regulations, cases, and commentary."'I How one can use
basis to one's advantage and how the Treasury exacts a price
for enjoying an immediate advantage from basis are not even
part of this process. 1
The use of a narrative'6 permits one to link basis, by
analogy, to human relationships: 16 7 seller and buyer or donor
and donee. Thus, the narrative illustrates the determination
of basis by highlighting the different relationships between
taxpayers, rather than the particular relationships between
the taxpayer and his property. The narrative also allows one
to compare tax logic, in which basis is handed from one
taxpayer to another, with the economic consequences of the
transfer of property.
In addition, the narrative allows the comparison of
economic consequences with tax consequences which flow
from the applicable basis. For example, suppose that the
transferee acquires property by paying the transferor twenty
dollars. In an economic sense, one would infer that the cost
of the property, twenty dollars, will become the transferee's
basis. To use the Kahn definition, 16 twenty dollars is the
maximum for which the transferee can sell the property
without a profit or, to use tax terminology, without realizing
a gain. However, if the buyer and seller are married, this
relationship will override the economic consequences of the
transaction. The applicable basis is not the cost basis, but a
basis generated by a section of the Code applicable to
transfers between spouses or former spouses in connection
164. For a list of recent commentary on basis, see GERSHAM GOLDSTEIN, INDEX TO
FEDERAL TAX ARTICLES (Isa Lang & Michael Lang eds., Spring Cumulative Supp. 1992)
(indexing 59 articles on basis published between October 1987 and the spring of 1992).
165. Cf Joseph M. Dodge, Transfers with Retained Interests and Powers, 50 TAX
MGMT. A79-81 (5th ed. 1992) (arguing that a completed gift which is not included in
the transferor's gross estate will avoid increasing the tax base).
166. See West, supra note 150, at 146. Legal theory relies heavily on the narrative
form. West uses the legal theories of Freud to support the views of legal liberalists:
that law must be autonomous from politics and that law has a moral role in the history
of human civilization. West analyzes Totem and Taboo, Freud's historical account of
the origin of law, and Civilization and Its Discontents, in which Freud applied his rule
of law to the origin of law and public morality. See Robin West, Law, Rights, and Other
Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freud's Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. 817 (1986).
167. The "cost" of a gift will be paid in the future. The recipient knows that she
owes a debt to the donor. However, a gift basis does carry a hidden, but nevertheless
present, obligation.
168. See KAHN, supra note 159, at 14.
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with a divorce."' In the latter case, the basis of the property
becomes not what the buyer paid the seller, but what the
basis of the seller was at the time of the transfer. In turn,
that basis is determined by the relationship of the seller-
spouse with the former owner of the property. The amount
of the basis will be determined under the appropriate
formula based on the seller's relationship.
Thus, the buyer's basis cannot be determined by what she
paid. The buyer is treated as a transferee-spouse. Hence,
she has a status inconsistent with the status of one who
acquires property by paying its fair market value in cash. In
effect, the transferee's marital status makes the cash
payment irrelevant.
When, as in the prior example, the tax laws' consequences
challenge both one's reasoning and one's intuition, the
narrative serves an additional function. The juxtaposition of
the statute and its application are possible in print.
However, a video is able to add the element of criticism to
the explanatory material regarding the statute. The
absurdity and the surprise of the cash paying transferee can
be fused with the former elements on one screen. Thus,
because one can acknowledge the surprise of the transferee
while one learns to apply the basis rule for transfers between
spouses, the rule, and the confirmation that its application
produces strange tax consequences, can be processed
simultaneously. The viewer's natural tendency to try to
make sense of the statute will be suppressed.
The memory of the narrative overcomes the impulse to
reject the correct but illogical tax basis rule, that is, that the
transferee's payment of cash did not affect his basis in the
property. Thus, the statute, its application, and an evalua-
tion of the statute-a surprising result-are both learned and
retrieved from memory as one complete thought. 7 °
In contrast, the use of a linear format in which the princi-
ple and evaluation of the principle are presented serially
requires several processes to categorize the transaction,
169. I.R.C. § 1041(b) (1988).
170. The use of narrative can include humor. This, however, is risky. See Jordan,
supra note 126, at 700. More than artistic failure may follow if the joke is funny
enough to make good newspaper copy, but is not politically correct. See id. at 702-03.
Failure also may occur if the joke is published in Kansas. See id- at 724-25 (noting
that the Supreme Court of Kansas fired a clerk who included a humorous poem in an
official report).
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apply the law, and disclaim the economic selection of a cost
basis for the transferee of the property. With a video
presentation, the inquiry can be focused artificially on the
relationship between two spouses and their relative power.
It is clear that the spouse who paid cash and could not use
the cost basis has less power than the spouse who took the
cash and did not have income. In short, it is the memory of
the emotional and visual content which heightens interest in
a tax concept such as basis. The narrative element of a video
reinforces the technical principle that the relationship
between the transferor and transferee determines the
transferee's basis in the property.
The use of the narrative in video can establish the need for
a particular tax principle before the viewer learns the princi-
ple. The narrative enhances the viewer's concentration 171 on
the material that can be boring to the unsophisticated (or
even the sophisticated) reader. Thus, one need not attempt
to acquire the technical language before the clear need to use
that language is established."7
For example, if a character makes a mistake in tax plan-
ning, the character, and not the viewer, suffers the bad tax
consequences. The viewer is not embarrassed by not
knowing what will happen because someone else will slip on
the banana peel. In addition, a video presents many
examples in a short time. Eventually, the viewer will
anticipate the bad tax consequences and feel confident about
learning tax. Hence, the eventual interpretation of the text
will be a positive, rather than a negative, experience.
With video technology, one need not isolate the various
elements of a tax concept. By visually demonstrating how a
kind of chameleon principle, such as basis, works in different
situations, video prompts one to discover the workings of the
concept as a whole. For example, a concrete image can
clarify that basis always is used for the same function. It
may, for example, be used to designate basis as an object,
171. The purely rational presentation of law does not take into account the "subtle
and perennial tensions among conscious, preconscious, and unconscious processes."
GARDNER, supra note 110, at 14.
172. First, we learn that the cookie tastes good. Then, we learn its name. "The
child explores the world first through action, then through imagery, and finally through
language." RUDOLF ARNHEIM, A Plea for Visual Thinking, in NEW ESSAYS ON THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ART, supra note 16, at 136. One learns language by combining tone with
symbolic meaning and concrete application. To learn the law, one must learn a new
language before one learns how to use that language in a context.
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such as a red block. 173 The basis 74 then may appear as a
larger rectangle when it represents a cost basis and a smaller
rectangle when it represents a gift basis. However, whether
large or small, the basis always is subtracted to determine
gain. The video can show simultaneously that the concept of
basis always performs the same function in the same way
even though the performance appears in a number of
different contexts in which the size of the basis is greater or
smaller depending on its context.
Thus, one sees basis as a recognizable concrete object-a
red rectangle-and at the same time, one sees that it always
performs the same function. The color red can be
incorporated in supplementary graphics in which simple
arithmetic examples illustrate the application of the basis
principle. In addition, the ordering of the process can be
illustrated by representing visually the chronology of events
in determining the calculation of gain or loss for tax
purposes. That is, although the formula for determining gain
is subtracting the basis from the amount realized (the sale
price of property), the amount of one's basis must be
determined by reference to a prior transaction. This
complicated process can be explained in seconds through
moving pictures.
Through video technology, the basis is always a symbolic,
but nevertheless concrete, picture of the term. 17' The
changes in the amount of the basis, such as the high or low
basis, do not obstruct the fact that gain is always determined
by subtracting the basis from the amount realized. The
concept is inescapable. The fact that the particular basis
being used for this function is a cost basis, a gift basis, or
some other form of basis is relevant to the context of the
example. The function of basis is the focus of the example,
but the peculiar species of basis is a part of the background
173. NOBODY GETS MARRIED FOR THE FIRST TIME ANYMORE, PART I: How DIVORCE
BECAME THE LAST TAX SHELTER IN AMERICA (Thirsty Productions 1990) [hereinafter
NOBODY GETS MARRIED FOR THE FIRSTTIME ANYMORE]. There, basis is portrayed as a red
three-dimensional box, and an animated red rectangle, on both of which the word
"basis" appears. The word is used in addition to a specific shape and color both for
additional reinforcement of the symbol and to teach one who cannot see red.
174. Here, an arbitrary graphic, a rectangle, depicts an abstract concept. For a
discussion of the visualization of processes and broad concepts, see R.E. WILEMAN,
EXERCISES IN VISUAL THINKING 47-49, 91, 101 (1980).
175. Cf. STUART DAVIS, RUE LIPP (painting 1928) (depicting scale glass objects,
opaque to the background and translucent within).
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or context of the problem and, hence, appropriately treated
in a secondary way.
Through the use of video, one is able to fuse the concrete
and symbolic images and thereby to manipulate the function
of basis in a variety of situations without losing sight of the
function of basis. Basis exists in order to determine gain or
loss for tax purposes. Thus, through the use of multisensory
presentation that is possible with video, the theory of basis
is shown immediately. Furthermore, the symbolic and the
concrete aspect of basis is repeated continuously with each
peculiar application of the concept.
In giving a physical dimension to a tax concept, video
technology also shows that basis is handed from one charac-
ter (the transferor) to another (the transferee). One sees, in
general, that the basis is acquired through the taxpayer's
relationship with the former owner of the property and not
the taxpayer's relationship with the property itself.'76 Since
basis-an object-is acquired from a relationship with
another taxpayer, the idea that basis can change because of
the owner's relationship with the other taxpayer is easier to
accept. Literature or acculturation teaches that property
received from one's favorite aunt or from one's spouse will
have a distinct cost to the donee, while property purchased
for oneself has a different cost. It is easier to comprehend
that the basis of property differs according to the relationship
between the transferor and the transferee. Thus, video
provides a context and history simultaneously with the
introduction of a tax principle. 1
77
Although most of formal education is concerned with the
176. The act of seeing describes several layers of comprehension.
Seeing is an act, according to Magritte, in the course of which it can happen that
a subject escapes our attention. "A thing which is present can be invisible,
hidden by what it shows." For example, "it is possible to see someone take off his
hat in salute without thinking of politeness."
GABLIK, supra note 50, at 12.
177. Future technology may allow students to become a character in an interactive
computer simulation of a legal problem and affect the outcome of the video. See
Andrew Pollack, Where Electronics and Art Converge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991, at Fl.
The technology generally is called "virtual reality" or VR, but "[w]onks, hackers,
computer scientists, cognitive psychologists, graphic artists and mirror-worldly
philosophers are happily engaged in [a] linguistic melee [to name the technology]."
William Safire, On Language: Virtual Reality, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1992, § 6
(Magazine), at 18.
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written and spoken word,' 78 reality is what we see-"we see
our world." 79
But we do not see unambiguously. Hence, strong visual
symbols such as a flag'~S send multiple messages. Movement
178. WILEMAN, supra note 174, at 16 ("Despite the fact that we see our world more
than we speak or read of it, we are rarely trained in the use of visualization, i.e.,
communicating messages visually."). Visual forms of communication lead to "complex
relationships between words (verbal images) and pictures (visual images). Part of this
complexity stems from the fact that there are many types of verbal/visual image
relationships." Id. at 33. Picture symbols include models, sculptures, photographs, and
drawings. Graphic symbols include the concrete silhouettes, or stylized "concept related
graphic" and the arbitrary graphic symbol, such as using a square to represent a
corporation. Verbal symbols include a definition or description or a single word such
as a noun. The representation travels from the concrete to the abstract. Id. at 23,
32-33.
179. Id. at 16. A picture, a chart, a geometric symbol, and a highlighted portion of
a verbal formula all are visual concepts. In contrast, text flashed on the screen is not
a visual concept.
The power of visual images can be inferred from the imprisonment and murder of
artists by totalitarian governments. See Michael Kimmelman, Visions of Truth,
Smuggled Out of Hell, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1991, at H2-28 (reviewing works by
imprisoned artists who were forced to paint Nazi propaganda depicting a concentration
camp as a model Jewish ghetto and who secretly painted the horror of life there). Karel
Fleischmann painted a 'movie house as a hospital in which the empty numbered seats
are like tombstones identifying the dead by the numbers that the Nazis made them
wear." Id. at 27. The paintings were hidden, some smuggled out to Switzerland.
When the Nazis found out about their work, two artists were "immediately tortured and
then deported to Auschwitz, where they died. Both captor and captive understood
equally how art could mold the world's perception of reality." Id.
180. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). Johnson burned a flag in protest
against the policies of the Reagan administration at the Republican National Conven-
tion in Dallas during 1984 and was convicted of flag desecration. Id. at 399-400. The
Texas statute recognized the flag as a "venerated object." Id. at 400. Justice Brennan,
writing for the Court, held that on its face the statute violated freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment: there was no way to separate the act of burning
the flag from the message that it intended to convey. Id. at 415-16. The bedrock
principle of the First Amendment "is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or dis-
agreeable." Id. at 414.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote that "the flag holds a lonely place
of honorf;l ... the flag is constant in expressing beliefs Americans share, beliefs in law
and peace and that freedom which sustains the human spirit." Id. at 421 (Kennedy,
J., concurring). The flag was a symbol of the right to express political beliefs, the very
symbol that protects the flag burner who degrades it. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist
stated that he would have upheld the statute because of the unique and historical
significance of the flag as a symbol of national unity:
Millions and millions of Americans regard [the flag] with an almost mystical
reverence regardless of what sort of social, political, or philosophical beliefs they
may have. I cannot agree that the First Amendment invalidates the Act of
Congress, and the laws of 48 of the 50 States, which make criminal the public
burning of the flag.
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enhances the linguistic quality of a visual or verbal image.181
For example, the action at "all fall down" in the nursery
rhyme Ring Around the Rosy is a combination of rhyme and
movement which indicates that the subject of the fall is
people. But without movement, the phrase alone could refer
to other things, like blocks, waterfalls, pain, or breaking. If
one blew over a house of cards, it would have a different,
banal meaning.l It would not mean death because the
Id. at 429 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Stevens equated the act not with
speech but with spray painting public property. Hence, the flag cannot be one's own
property to destroy. Id. at 437 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenting position that
the flag burning was not speech was not accepted. For Rehnquist, flag burning is not
the "picture ... worth a thousand words" but a "roar," and tone is not communication
protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 432 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). For the
rest of the Court, however, it appears that the message or the intent to communicate
an idea is what makes an utterance an act of speech.
181. Kandinsky saw in dance the possibility of abstract musical, pictorial, and
physical movement. KANDINSKY, supra note 80, at 51; see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (holding that nude dancing is a form of "expressive conduct"
which is protected by the First Amendment). At issue in Glen Theatre was an Indiana
statute that prohibited nude dancing and required erotic dancers to wear pasties and
G-strings. The Court held that the statute was a permissible burden on the desired
activity because the restriction imposed was unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion. Id at 2462. The restriction sought to prevent public nudity, not the erotic
message conveyed by the dancers. IkL at 2463. In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter
also agreed that "performance dancing is inherently expressive." Id. at 2468 (Souter,
J., concurring). The dissent, however, argued that the nudity element of the dance
itself was an expressive component of the dance and could not be categorized as conduct
separate from the expression: "[Nlude dancing performances may generate emotions
and feelings of eroticism and sensuality among the spectators ... [b]ut generating
thoughts, ideas, and emotions is the essence of communication.' Id. at 2474 (White, J.,
dissenting). Compare HENRI MATISSE, DANCE (painting 1909) (depicting nonrepre-
sentational nude dancers in circle) with DANCE II (painting 1909) (depicting the same
subject, but in a darker color and with details of muscle indicating older dancers and
strain).
182. A visual image, like a joke, should need no explanation. See generally NIGEL
HOLMES, DESIGNER'S GUIDE TO CREATING CHARTS & DIAGRAMS 9 (1984) (arguing that a
chart "can interpret the figures as well as present them"); Patton, supra note 11, at 29
('[Tihere are between 900 billion and two trillion statistical graphics printed annually
worldwide. 'Clutter and confusion are failures of design, not attributes of information.'"
(quoting Edward R. Tufte, Political Science Professor at Yale University)).
An animated video sequence depicts loan proceeds as dollar bills and the obligation
to repay as a balloon labeled "loan" to demonstrate the principle that the forgiveness
of a loan results in gross income for the debtor. Forgiveness of the loan is inferred by
the disappearance or explosion of the object representing the loan (the balloon labeled
"loan"). Since the money remains, one sees that the debtor has income at the point that
the obligation to repay disappears. See NOBODY GETS MARRIED FOR THE FIRST TIME
ANYMORE, supra note 173 (noting how divorce changes the principle of Crane v.
Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947)). Crane held that the amount of debt to which
transferred property is subject is included in the amount realized by the transferor.
331 U.S. at 14. The amount realized less basis (usually the cost of the property)
determines the amount of gain which will be included in gross income.
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reference to people is made in the gesture and the pause in
the action.18' In addition, movement by itself carries a
linguistic message.1 4 Unspoken communication was created
as an art form by the work of dancers such as Martha
Graham. Graham's movements were the "invention of a new
and codified dance language[,]... [p]owerful, dynamic,
jagged and filled with tension . ."" In movement,
183. According to same scholars, the words "falling down" appear in modern English
versions of the rhyme giving "would-be origin finders the opportunity to say that the
rhyme dates backto the days ofthe GreatPlague." THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OFNURSERY
RHYMES 365 (Iona & Peter Opie eds., 1951). A rosy rash was a symptom of the Great
Plague and posies of herbs were carried to ward off the disease. "[Sneezing was a final
fatal symptom, and 'all fall down' was exactly what happened." Id. The English
version uses the words "A-tishoo! A-tishoo!" (an English onomatopoeia for the sneeze
sound) in place of the American "Ashes, Ashes." Other English versions of the rhyme
do not end with the words "all fall down," and the Oxford editors prefer the happier
versions. See id. at 364-65. It appears that the American version (likely a linguistic
degeneration, akin to the process by which the British cry for the end of the game "hide
and seek," namely, "All ye, All ye, Urchins free," became "All-e, all-e, Auction free") is
closer to the ancient roots of the rhyme than the more evolved English forms
standardized in the late 19th century. "
184. See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y.)
(holding that begging is graphic, informative, persuasive speech), rev'd, 903 F.2d 146
(2d Cir.) (holding that begging in the city subway system is not expressive speech
protected by the First Amendment), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990). Compare R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), in which petitioner was accused of burning
a cross in the yard of a black family. He was charged with violating an anti-hate
ordinance, which prohibited anyone from placing on public or private property symbols,
objects, graffiti, etc. that were intended to arouse anger in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion, or gender. The Court held the ordinance was unconstitutional on
its face because it was content-based; content-based regulations are presumptively
invalid under the First Amendment. Id. at 2541. In Young, the ban against personal
begging as opposed to eleemosynary solicitations in New York subways prompted a suit
on behalf of the homeless which symbolized the relation between the destitute and the
state, and raised the issue of whether begging is a protected form of political
expression. Paul G. Chevigny, Begging and the First Amendment: Young v. New York
City Transit Authority, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 525,527 (1991). The Young plaintiff claimed
that his speech was not political, but he did not claim that his speech was commercial.
For an explanation of restrictions on commercial speech, see Board of Trustees v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469 (1989). In more recent cases, the Supreme Court has focused on whether
the act of speech occurred in a public forum and not the issue of whether begging was
a form of speech. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112
S. Ct. 2701, 2706 (1992) (holding that airports, unlike roads, are not traditional public
fora and upholding a ban on solicitation); Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2709, 2710 (1992) (striking down a ban on distribution
of literature at airports). But see icL at 2710 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting that
travelers are annoyed equally by literature or begging).
185. Anna Kisselgoff, Choreographer Hailed for Creating a Language, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 1991, at Al.
FALL 1992]
118 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL 26:1
language is physical, giving "visible substance to things
felt,"1" and at least within a culture, the mute communica-
tion is intuitive.
The act of seeing is essentially one of perceiving movement:
essentially grabbing and clutching at moving images. 187 For
the brain, vision is a motor activity,"a "inextricably bound to
the 'sense' of movement.""
Whether one believes, as Martha Graham did, that move-
ment does not lie" or, as others do, that television does not
convey "experience, but a selected set of images that in their
very partiality" distort and forever alter "the original
event," 9' television communicates through movement. For
many, television at its best appears as reality,'92 "a 'reality'
so potent it cannot be denied" by the viewer. 9 3  However,
seeing is both the product of what is out there and the
reaction of our brain's visual system." That is, our brain
ignores "ambiguous" perceptions and focuses on the "socially
186. Id. The linguistic qualities of movement such as the art pioneered by Martha
Graham communicate with the audience through a visceral rather than an intellectual
response. Id.
187. WEES, supra note 154, at 86-87. Similar findings were made by the child
psychologist Arnold Gesell. Id.
188. Id. at 87.
189. Id. In the courtroom, movement will revive the jury. See JOSEPH, supra note
11, § 9.03[1](3). For example, charts which contain removable pieces which reveal
previously hidden information, or magnetic boards where pieces move, are helpful for
the jury. See id. app. K, at A-81 (depicting a magnetized diagram of an intersection
with moveable cutout cars).
190. Kisselgoff, supra note 185, at Al.
191. Richard W. Fox, The Reality Box, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., May 3, 1992, at 7
(stating that television appears as an "immediate presence," but one sees "through a
lens darkly").
192. Pollack, supra note 177, at Fl (discussing projected environments).
193. Fox, supra note 191, at 7. Whether the quality of truth will be ascribed to an
image will vary with the current popular view of the medium, the forum in which the
object is presented (its context), and the viewers expectation of the intent of the artist.
MARK ROSKILL & DAVID CARRIER, TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD IN VISUAL IMAGES 115 (1983).
According to Roskill and Carrier, the "truth" of a visual image may be realized in three
different senses. First, as an icon, "embodying a certain quality or effect." Id. at 117;
see also RENE MAGRITTE, FANTOMAS (painting 1912). Second, as an index, "evidentially
securing that a happening or process took place." ROSKILL & CARRIER, supra, at 117; see
also photographs showing the American flag on the moon. Third, as a symbol,
"summing up and showing forth certain social and political values." ROSKILL & CARRIER,
supra, at 117; see also GIORGIO DE CHIRICO, SONG OF LOVE (painting 1913) (depicting
disparate images of dream symbolism which taken together represent love); SAINT
AUGUSTINE, SOLILOQUIES 2.10(18) (We should, instead, seek that truth which is not self-
contradictory and two-faced so that it is true on one side, false on another."), reprinted
in 44 FATHERS OF THE CHURCH 1 (Thomas F. Gilligan trans., 1948) (n.d.).
194. WEES, supra note 154, at 28.
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shared perceptions" of the ordinary members of the culture. 9 '
Television frames our view in that one looking through a lens
focuses on what is conventionally important and ignores most
of one's surroundings. Thus, the conventional view of an
observer is magnified when the observation is made of an
event on television.
Because its images move, television shows events in real
time. However, the video image, like film, is actually a
series of stills which, like a "flip book," are perceived as
movement. The illusion of movement is created by our brain,
not by our eyes.' 9 Thus, when as few as two photographs are
placed together, it is natural to see a connection. 197  In
contrast, even if closely sequential photographs are viewed
separately, our brain often does not connect the images." 8
This visual phenomenon worked for the defense at the trial
of the police officers in the Rodney King video. At the trial,
the freeze-frames, shown one at a time, became disconnected
from one another and eliminated the physiological (as well as
the logical) relationship that flows between the frames in a
video. "[T]he fundamental biological reaction is that of
reacting to happenings not that of contemplating objects." 199
In effect, the defense inserted a still photograph into the
center of a moving picture. Such a sudden discontinuity of
timing causes the "impression of rigid standstill"2 -the
absence of movement eliminated the quick changes of
relative space between the figure of King and the group of
195. I& at 69.
196. Max Wertheimer described experiments in "illusory movement," where he set
up two lighted slots near one another in a dark' room and pushed up each light one at
a time before his subject. "If the distance and the exposure time were correctly chosen,
the person had the overwhelming impression that there were not two separate slots
lighting up one after the other and beside each other, but that one slot appeared on the
left, ran over to the right and was there extinguished." ARNHEIM, supra note 44, at 88.
The same unified impression, "stroboscopic fusion of objectively separate stimuli,"
happens in film. Id. This is the fundamental principle of the movie. Id. Film is the
imperceptible montage of single frames. Id. The video image contains 30 frames (stills)
per second. Each frame contains two fields. Hence, a second of video includes 60
images.
197. See CHRISTIAN METZ, FILM LANGUAGE 46 (Michael Taylor trans., 1974) ("Going
from one image to two images, is to go from image to language.").
198. Metz notes that still photos are not narrative. "An isolated photograph can of
course tell nothing!" Id- at 45-46.
199. ARNHEIM, supra note 44, at 135.
200. Id. at 101. The effect of inserting a still differs from an actor holding a pose.
"[Tihere is an astonishing difference between such voluntary cessation of motion and
the absolute rigidity of a photograph. .. ." Id at 102.
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officers. The moving picture showed force; the still photos
did not.
Similarly, playing the video in slow motion changed the
element of force. The slower film decreased the acceleration
of the baton and lessened its perceived speed. One senses
force in the acceleration of speed-not in the decrease of
speed. Slow motion changes the forceful blows to a wave of
the hand.
Additionally, highlighting the figure of King alone changed
the configuration formed by the group of police and King.
The shape of the event changed both geometrically and
psychologically. Furthermore, highlighting the figure of King
exaggerated the grid-like perspective of the lens and the cold
and manufactured look of the photographic process.
The Rodney King video became part of a
genre 2°'-television shows in which the police are the
heroes. °2 Therefore, the video evidence, even if true or
commonplace in reality, had the "enormous weight that must
be raised by whoever wants to say" something for the first
time on the screen. 2°  The "choice of film as means of
expression, as a form of saying.., automatically results" in
a preference for certain subjects.2' In this context, the
portrayal of the police as villains was inconsistent with the
medium. The prosecution's reliance on the video caused a
specific difficulty with the genre previously established by
television; therefore, the video evidence was not plausible.
Thus, changes in the tempo of the action and freezing the
action changed perception. In the case of the King video, the
perception altered significantly. Even minor alterations,
however, could have had significant effect. Scientists have
discovered that "[t]iny differences in input could quickly
become overwhelming differences in output," an effect named
"sensitive dependence on initial conditions"-what meteorolo-
gists sometimes call the Butterfly Effect. 2 5 For example, "a
butterfly stirring the air today in Peking can transform
201. See MEI2Z, supra note 197, at 70 (discussing cowboys in black and white
costumes).
202. Cf id. at 70-71 (discussing the unstable but paradigmatic category of the
cowboy movie).
203. Id- at 246; see JAMES MONACO, How TO READ A FILM 146 (rev. ed. 1981)
(explaining the codes of the cinema).
204. METZ, supra note 197, at 235, 238-39, 244-46; see id at 249-52 (noting the
imperfect relationship between the truth and the "Plausible").
205. GLEICK, supra note 14, at 8.
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storm systems next month in New York."2w There is less
order in the universe of our law than meteorologists find in
weather predictions. The outcome of the police brutality trial
is a vivid example of how law has "strayed far from human
intuition about the world."2 °7 Since the 1960s, scientists
have turned from the "reality that could be frozen motion-
less"08 to finding "the connection between motion and
universal form,"2° the flows that produce the shapes we see
from instant to instant.2 0  The new science, called "chaos"
uses computers and pictures to study motion,211 and to see
things that "physicists had learned not to see."21 2 Classical
scientists view the world as a collection of unrelated objects.
"For practical handling we deal with the constituents of our
world as 'things,' which are defined by their physical proper-
ties, i.e., their shape, size, color, texture, etc."2 3  Thus, we
learn to ignore the movement of objects (the flow) and hence
are not consciously aware "that objects are perceived as
possessed by directed forces." 14  In contrast to visual
perception, tones are understood as activities, not objects.1 5
"[T]ones are always happenings in time."21  Whether music
is perceived as embodying an emotion because of a
206. 1&
207. I& at 6 (discussing the field of theoretical physics).
208. Id- at 196.
209. 1k
210. Id. at 197.
211. 1& at 4.
212. Id. at 45. Chaos is, in fact, only part of the behavior of complex systems.
There is also the counterintuitive phenomenon of antichaos, which holds that some very
disordered systems spontaneously transform into a high degree of order. See Stuart
A. Kauffman, Antichaos and Adaptation, SCI. AM., Aug. 1991, at 78,82-83 (stating that
computer models suggest that biological evolution may have been shaped by self-organi-
zation and natural selection).
213. ARNHEIM, supra note 16, at 214. In the traditional study of dynamics, the
world is viewed as a continuous series of autonomous events, segmented into smaller
parts which are linked together by the arbitrary designation of points beginning and
ending at fixed points, rather than a related system of ever-changing attractions and
fleeting relationships with beginnings and endings imposed by the temporary intrusion
of linear reasoning on the vibrant action. The traditional way of analyzing movement
is useful for most of what happens on earth, including rocket travel. It is not, however,
a useful way to solve human problems because it requires limiting unknown variables.
See IAN STEWART, DOES GOD PLAY DICE?: THE MATHEMATICS OF CHAOS 57 (1989) (compaing
mathematics with Joseph Heller's Catch 22).
214. ARNHEIM, supra note 16, at 214.
215. 1& at 215. For an excellent example of recapturing and recreating the music
of an earlier period, and therefore recreating the events themselves, listen to MCCAULEY,
REED, AND VIDRINE, 1929 AND BACK (Swallow Records 1991).
216. ARNHEIM, supra note 16, at 215.
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physiological structure or because of an emotional conven-
tion, tone and emotion are not new languages. "A state of
mind" appears as "a pattern of sounds."217 For example,
according to the gestalt theory, movement in the form of
dance or music has a kindred structure "so compelling
perceptually that it is directly... experienced."
218
Music highlights the repetition of events to form a pattern
of operation or explains that variations repeat the pattern
rather than change it. 219  Unlike text or pictures, music
signifies action or "happenings," or "a pattern of dynamic
relations,"20 as opposed to objects. 1 Music adds even more
by helping to set the emotional content of the visual imagery.
For example, the horror glissando used in mystery movies
and radio suspense programs' cues the audience that the
following transaction will have dangerous (scary?) conse-
quences.
Musical tone further clarifies the message' by adding a
meaning separate from that of the word spoken.' For
example, when law depends entirely on the discrete text,
217. Id. at 221.
218. Id. at 222.
219. See KANDINSKY, supra note 80, at 16,35-41 (discussing the connections among
color, movement, music, and human experience). In the gestalt psychology, the term
isomorphism describes the "similarity of structure in materially disparate media."
ARNHEIM, supra note 16, at 222. One experiences the "structural kinship" of dance (the
movement of visual shapes and the sequence of a kinetic pattern) and its accompanying
music (the sequence of sounds). Id. "'he place and function of a single element [of a
piece of music], e.g., a particular tone in a scale, is defined only by the pattern as a
whole." Id. at 225.
220. ARNHEIM, supra note 16, at 215.
221. Id.
222. Hear, e.g., The Shadow (CBS radio broadcast, aired 1930-32, 1934-54).
223. Although words that are spoken or sung may be perceived and remembered
differently, we use sound as an unconscious cue which communicates danger or speed.
In the semantic sense, tone does not include the recognizable theme music for a
character, such as the music created by Sergei Prokofiev in Peter and the Wolf. In the
latter case, the sounds themselves consciously become a kind of name for the character.
224. Tone and content are not necessarily consistent; if inconsistency occurs, tone
dominates. "Do students take away the same message we think we are conveying?"
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 4. For a discussion of musical interpretation from the
performer's point of view, see Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music and Other
Performing Arts, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1608-09 (1991) ("For what is a musical score
but a series of directions concerning tempo, meter, pitch, rhythm, attack, and
orchestration that are to be carried out over time by a group of performers?"). Tone is
important in the law also. See Cathy Boost, Palm Beach Trial, TIME, Dec. 23,1991, at
38 (noting that voice stress analysis was used by a prosecutor); Claire Smith, Mets Rape
Case Transferred to the Florida State Attorney, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1992, at B 1I (stating
that police use voice stress analysis).
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tone specifies the meaning of its words. Thus, if one reads a
text aloud, the voice and its pauses funnel the meaning of the
text so that its seemingly infinite interpretations appear
serially. Even the addition of multiple but individual inflec-
tions presents the interpreter with the potential of classify-
ing and eventually grading the alternative interpretive
possibilities.2
The dramatic possibilities so abundant in the law-and the
possibilities to amplify them through tone, music, and
movement-are treated as incidental to the goal of perfecting
legal analysis.226 When video does appear in the law school
classroom, it appears only as the servant of the school's
prime educational vehicle, the analytico-verbal vehicle.
Lectures may be videotaped for the convenience of the
instructor, for example. But the taping does not change the
content of the lecture significantly. As early plastic manufac-
turers failed when plastic was substituted in designs created
for wood and metal, lawyers use video merely to record what
was intended to be read. They ignore its synthetic perspec-
tive complementary to the analytic style of most lectures and
textbooks. 7 Historically, our society fears visual expres-
sion.Y I suggest that the form of abstract reasoning entailed
by homogeneous literacy cannot address the issues facing a
postliterate society in which kinetic visual images and tones,
not words, dominate semantic communication. The
225. But see GARDNER, supra note 110, at 239 (noting that television viewers draw
inferences from the video information rather than their own personal experiences).
Studies of children have compared reading aloud to one group and showing a video of
the same story to another group. The book group used their prior life experience to
evaluate the action in the story, but the television group did not. The television
children, using different lines of reasoning, relied overwhelmingly on what they had
seen-how difficult an action looked or how someone appeared to feel-to buttress their
conclusions. The children rarely went beyond the "superficial flow" of video information
to consider "what was plausible." In contrast, the book children were far more likely
to draw on their own personal experiences. Although I have not found a similar study
on adults, if video suspends the viewer's imagination, one may question the probative
value of video in trial and appellate courts.
226. See generally Symposium, Pedagogy of Narrative, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 2 (1990)
("Law has become an increasingly active feature in any story that we might try to tell
or live. So it is fitting that legal academics should rediscover the narrative perspective
and recommence the telling of stories.").
227. Kandinsky wrote, "To harmonize the whole is the task of art." KANDINSKY,
supra note 80, at 3.
228. Naron, supra note 149, at 93 (noting that Benjamin Franklin was the first
American political cartoonist and the first politician thus ridiculed). But see United
States v. Brentley, 961 F.2d 425, 426 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that a videotape of the
trial satisfied an indigent defendant's right on appeal to a free trial transcript).
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expression of dynamic function rather than objects may
generate changes in conventional legal thought. Legal
thinking is stuck in Newton's world of objects. Based on
quantum theory and chaos, scientists have revised the
common view of reality. Legal doctrines are crumbling and
new patterns of thought have not yet developed,2 9 nor will
new legal principles emerge through the thought forms of a
bygone age. In other words, printed matter itself, and not
just certain styles of presenting it, limits legal reasoning and
is an important reason why the role-or at least the
influence-once granted the lawyer in the community and
society has diminished. Although words still help us reason,
the computer or the television has supplanted the printed
page as the source of authority in the world outside the
courtroom." ° Legal reasoning now must be based on more
than verbal metaphors to be convincing.
229. See Daniel Bell, Into the 21st Century, Bleakly, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1992, at
E17 (claiming that there are no unified sets of beliefs to take the place of old
ideologies); cf. Collier, supra note 34, at 240-43 (stating that Justice Scalia's willingness
to overturn precedent weakens the doctrine of stare decisis).
230. See ULMER, supra note 42, at 5.
